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CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM:
AUTONOMOUS PHYSICIAN
EXTENDERS WILL NECESSITATE A
SHIFT TO ENTERPRISE LIABILITY
COVERAGE FOR HEALTH CARE
DELIVERY
Thomas R. McLeant
I. INTRODUCTION
IN LATE 1999, the Institute of Medicine set off a media
feeding frenzy over medical errors with its public assertion that
health care providers kill almost 100,000 people each year. Fif-
teen months latter in a much less publicized report, the Institute
of Medicine offered its solutions for the carnage associated with
health care delivery. Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Heath
Care System for the 21st Century recommends that our nation
jettison the traditional health care system by amending state
professional board enabling statutes to liberalize the utilization
of physician extenders, who will be protected from liability by
enterprise liability. The purpose of this article is to stimulate
discussion on this comprehensive plan to overhaul our health
care delivery system.
Part II provides an overview of our health care delivery
system vis-a-vis the Institute of Medicine's recent reports. Part
III reviews the authority for state professional boards. While
state licensure laws do limit multidisciplinary medical practice
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by granting physicians hegemony over physician extenders,
changing this system will be difficult because medicine is regu-
lated at the state rather than federal level. Removal of the
patchwork system of state licensure laws and scope of practice
laws will be difficult, but it is possible to remove this barrier by
using conditional federal funds. Part IV looks at the nature of
physician extenders and how and why the law traditionally
holds such health care providers to a lower standard of care than
it has traditionally held physicians. Consequently, solely shift-
ing health care delivery from a physician-based to a physician
extenders-based system of health care-in order to create a mul-
tidisciplinary health care delivery system that is more effective
and responsive to the needs of patients and more cost effi-
cient-from a legal perspective, would provide an unequivocal
incentive to lower the quality of health care delivery. Part V
examines the proposed alternative liability coverage systems of
enterprise liability. Conceptually, enterprise liability would pro-
vide that a business organization that provided negligent
medical care would bear the professional liability for compen-
sating patients injured by that care, regardless of the training
and qualification of the health care provider that injured the pa-
tient. Enterprise liability for health care delivery would be
analogous to product liability for manufactured goods. Enter-
prise liability would, thus, provide pecuniary incentives to the
health care business organizations to supervise physician ex-
tenders and, in essence, for the first time, make a negligent phy-
sician extender as liable as a negligent physician. Accordingly,
if America (or a state government) liberalizes the scope of prac-
tice for physician extenders to provide for multidisciplinary
health care delivery, then enterprise liability must supplant tra-
ditional malpractice liability to counteract the financial incen-
tives of allowing highly technical health care to be delivered by
individuals with a lower level of education and experience than
the traditional physician.
H. OVERVIEW
The Institute of Medicine's Crossing the Quality Chasm: A
New Heath System for the 21st Century begins with a clear
manifesto: "The American health care delivery system is in
[Vol. 12:239
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need of fundamental change."' Coming in the wake of the Insti-
tute's To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System, which
reported that up to 98,000 Americans die each year from errors
in our health care system,2 Crossing the Quality Chasm is a
"call for action to improve the [quality of the] American health
care delivery system as a whole." 3 Despite the fact that health
care expenses cost America over a trillion dollars a year,4 the
Institute of Medicine observes that "more than 70 publications
in leading peer-reviewed journals have documented serious
quality shortcomings." 5 In short, Crossing the Quality Chasm
confirms the previous assertion that the Institute of Medicine's
recent concern over the incidence of medical errors was a mere
pretext and political spin. The real message of To Err is Human
was in the subtext: health care delivery needs to be revolution-
ized to be affordable.
6
Politicians and pundits have come to a realization that the
quality of health care delivery is inexorably linked to the
method of payment.7 According to the Institute of Medicine, the
perverse payment incentives of fee-for-service and managed
care medicine have resulted in three types of poor quality care:
overuse, underuse, and misuse.8
1COMM. ON QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE IN AM., INST. OF MED., CROSSING THE
QUALITY CHASM: A NEw HEALTH SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 1 (2001) [hereinaf-
ter QUALITY CHASM]. The timing of the release of this report is interesting. Being
released one month into a new presidency, the report was undoubtedly intended to be
a message to the new administration.
2 COMM. OF QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE IN AM., INST. OF MED., To ERR Is Hu-
MAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM 1 (Linda T. Kohn et al. eds., 2000) [herein-
after To ERR Is HUMAN]; see also Elmer V. Villanueva & Jeremy N. Anderson, Esti-
mates of Complications of Medical Care in the Adult U.S. Population, 1 BMC
HEALTH SERVS. RESEARCH 2 (Mar. 29, 2001) (reaching the same conclusion but with
better scientific analysis), at http:llwww.biomedcentral.conl472-683/112) (reaching
the same conclusion but with better scientific analysis).
3 QUALITY CHASM, supra note 1, at 2.
4 See id. at 11 (stating that health care is now $1.1 trillion or 13.5% of the
GDP). 5 Id. at3.
6 Thomas R. McLean, The Implications of Patient Safety Research & Risk
Managed Care, 26 S. ILL. U. L.J. 227 (2002).
7 Id. at 39; see also JONAS & KOVNER'S HEALTH CARE DELIVERY IN THE
UNITED STATES, 372-74 (Anthony R. Kovner & Steven Jonas eds., 6th ed. 1999)
[hereinafter HEALTH CARE DELIVERY] (explaining relationship of cost containment to
quality of health care).
8 QUALITY CHASM, supra note 1, at 191-93. There is no question that pecuni-
ary incentives associated with fee-for-service medicine facilitate the over utilization
of health care services, while the pecuniary incentives associated with managed care
20021
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Overuse refers to the provision of health services for
which the potential risks outweigh the potential bene-
fits. Underuse indicates that a health care service for
which the potential benefits outweigh the potential risks
was not provided. Misuse occurs when otherwise appro-
priate care is provided, but in a manner that does or
could lead to avoidable complications. 9
"As a result of overuse, underuse, and misuse of health care
services, our society pays a substantial price."' 0
Accordingly, the Institute of Medicine opines that "[i]f we
want safer, high-quality care, we will need to have redesigned
systems of care, including the use of information technology to
support clinical and administrative processes."" To narrow the
quality chasm in health care, the Institute of Medicine recom-
mends the adoption of six goals to improve our health care sys-
tem: (1) make it safe (defined as the avoidance of injury), (2)
make it effective (as determined by evidence based medicine),
(3) make it patient-centered (that is the system is to be respect-
ful and responsive to the needs of patients), (4) make it timely
(free of delays), (5) make it efficient (free of waste), and (6)
make it equitable (delivered in a non-discriminatory manor).1 2
To achieve all of these goals, the Institute of Medicine is advo-
cating that in the 21st century, a collaborative multidisciplinary
team approach, rather than the traditional autonomous solo
practitioner model, be employed in the delivery of health care.13
"Health care is not just another service industry."'14 Accord-
ingly, the Institute of Medicine anticipates that collaborative
medicine facilitate the under utilization of health care services. See Thomas R.
McLean & Edward P. Richards, Managed Care Liability for Breach of Fiduciary
Duty After Pegram v. Herdrich: The End of ERISA Preemption for State Law Liability
for Medical Care Decision Making, 52 FLA. L. REV. 1, 35 (2001) (explaining the
effect of financial incentives a fee for service reimbursement system). But "misuse,"
as Institute of Medicine defines it, is the occurrence of an adverse event ("avoidable
complications that prevent patients from receiving full potential benefits of a ser-
vice") and is common to both systems of reimbursement. To ERR Is HUMAN, supra
note 2, at 16.
9 QUALITY CHASM, supra note 1, at 226.
'o Id. at 225.
" Id. at 4.
12 Id. at 5-6.
13 See id. at 210-1I. Collaborative multidisciplinary health care delivery con-
templates the replacement of physicians with physician extender.
14 Id. at 207.
[Vol. 12:239
CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM
multidisciplinary health care delivery will change both the ac-
countability and the standard by which health care providers a-e
measured and therefore, the nature of the relationships between
providers and patients. 15 Consequently, implementation of a
new health care system will require that the health care work-
force, that employs about six million individuals, with a variety
of educational backgrounds, will need to correspondingly
change.' 6 Because of this diversity, implementation of a new
health care system will not be a simple process.' 7 To facilitate
the introduction of collaborative multidisciplinary health care
delivery, the Institute of Medicine recommends that the work
place be prepared by a three-prong approach: (1) modifying
clinical education, (2) modifying the nature of professional
regulations, and (3) modifying the existing liability coverage.' 8
While the methodology by which we modify clinical education
is beyond the scope of this article, this article shall examine the
potential for, and the consequences of, liberalizing the scope of
practice for physician extenders.' 9 If the state professional board
enabling acts are modified to allow for increasing the independ-
ence of physician extenders, to provide for the collaborative
multidisciplinary practice of medicine, then it logically follows
that we must move from a traditional tort system of liability for
compensation of medical injury to an enterprise liability system
for compensation of medical injury. This is necessary in order
to provide physician extenders and their employers with the
proper financial incentive to maintain the current quality of
health care.
20
15 See id. at 211 (discussing how the changing relationship "calls for new
skills in communication and support for patient self-management").
16Id. at 207.
17 id.
' Id. at 207-19.
19 In this article, physician extenders are contemplated broadly as any indi-
vidual who provides a medical service in lieu of a physician. Thus physical, respira-
tory, and occupational therapist are physician extenders, as well as, physician assis-
tants (PAs), advanced practice nurses (APNs), and certified registered nurse anesthe-
tists (CRNAs). A physician, in turn, is a licensed practitioner of medicine or osteopa-
thy. While chiropractors, licensed psychologists and pharmacists provide medical-
type services, independent of medical community, chiropractors, licensed psycholo-
gists and pharmacists are neither physicians nor physician extenders for purpose of
this article. However, a "clinical pharmacist" (someone holding a Pharm D degree) is
a physician extender.
20 In essence, an analogous argument arises in the discussion of the multidis-
ciplinary practice of law; if we are going to allow lawyers to practice in collaborative
20021 243
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III. POLICE POWER AND STATE PROFESSJONAL
BOARDS
A. Historical Perspective of Police Power
Since colonial times, medicine has been regulated at the
state level.21 Early laws were primarily concerned with disease
control and nuisance abatement. 22 At the time of the Constitu-
tional Convention, Philadelphia was decimated by an epidemic
of Yellow fever.23 Fear of communicable disease permeated soci-
ety, resulting in the recognition that "the government, under the old
doctrine of societal self-defense, had plenary power to impose re-
strictions on property and persons to prevent to [sic] spread of dis-
ease; and second, that this power belonged to the states."
24
After the Civil War, the States began to shift their regula-
tory emphasis from 2public health to formal regulation of the
medical profession.2 While there was no shortage of self-
proclaimed and unschooled physicians prior to the Civil War,
absent the development of scientific knowledge, little distin-
guished the antebellum physician from his herbalist and charla-
tan colleagues. Consequently, "[in the minds of the populace and
the legislatures, there was no justification for setting some physi-
cians up with a state-enforced monopoly through licensing them,
and excluding other physicians."
26
However, by the 1880s a scientific basis had developed for
the understanding of disease processes. Ignaz Semmelweis'
hand washing recommendations had become an established
practice, as had Joseph Lister's antiseptic techniques. Building
situations, then the non-lawyers needs to step up to the ethical standards of the legal
profession. See Nathan Koppel, What, Me Worry?, Sept. 2, 2000, http://www.law.
com/cgi-bin/gx.cgi/AppLogic+FTContentServer?pagename=law/View&c=Article&
cid=ZZZ12DISACC&live=true&cst=l&pc=0&pa=0 (discussing multidisciplinary
practice of law).
21 Edward P. Richards, The Police Power and the Regulation of Medical
Practice: A Historical Review and Guide for Medical Licensing Board Regulation of
Physicians in ERISA-Qualified Managed Care Organizations, 8 ANNALS HEALTH L.
201,202 (1999).
22 1d. at 203.
23 Id. at 205.
24 Id. (citations omitted).
2 Prior to 1890, "legislators were concerned with improving the quality of
medical care, assuring fair pricing for medical services, and achieving other societal
goals, such as effective control of communicable diseases." Id. at 210.26 Id. at 207.
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on the work of Pasture, Koch formulated his famous "postu-
lates" for the identification of an infectious disease. With a firm
understanding of infectious disease and Morton's introduction
of anesthesia, Billroth was able to perform the first gastric re-
section. Thus, by the mid-1880s, application of medical science
distinguished the practice of medicine from other remnants of
medieval mysticism. "Once medical science began to offer ef-
fective treatments, it was in the interest of the public for physi-
cians to be educated in these treatments and the underlying
medical science." 27 For the first time, States began to prohibit
the performance of ineffective and dangerous treatments. In ad-
dition to direct prohibitions of certain practices, States also ini-
tiated licensure and scope of practice acts to regulate the prac-
tice of medicine.28 Unfortunately, States elected to avoid defin-
ing allowable medical practice in terms of specific procedures
or methods of practice. Rather, pursuant to state regulation, the
"practice of medicine [was] defined in terms of the diagnosis
and treatment of illness in the manner used by physicians, who
[met] the training requirements for licensure. This effectively
delegate[d] the definition of appropriate medical practice to
medical schools, residency programs, and their private accredi-
tation agencies."
29
B. Professional Licensure
State licensure and scope of practice acts are predicated on
the delegation of police power to the States.30 The extent to
which a State could regulate the practice of medicine was chal-
lenged in Dent v. West Virginia.31 At the time, West Virginia
granted a medical license in one of three ways: (1) the candidate
27 Id. at 210.
28 The discussion here will focus on physicians. A parallel discussion on state
licensure and scope of practice acts associated with physician extenders is omitted.
But see Dolores Sheppard, Physician Extenders in Managed Care: Reducing Risk
Through Supervision and Credentialing, 14 J. HEALTHcARERisKMGMT. 12 (1994).
29 Richards, supra note 21, at 211. Defining medicine in terms of "diagnosis
and treatment" raises the fundamental question of what is the practice of medicine in
the 21st Century when patients have become the primary care physicians.
30 The Constitution limits the power of the federal government to those that
are defined. Under the Constitution the authorization to act in the general welfare of
the population was relegated to the States. Hence, the States rather than the federal
government traditionally regulated pubic health and medicine under the rubric of
"police powers."
129 U.S. 114 (1889).
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was a graduate of a "reputable medical college" (2) the candidate
had been in practice for ten years period to the enactment of the
State's licensing act, or 3) the candidate passed an examination by
members of the state board of health.32 Failure to obtain licensure by
one of these prescribed methods constituted the unauthorized prac-
tice of medicine. Dent, who had not been in practice for ten years,
had only a diploma from the American Medical Eclectic College of
Cincinnati, Ohio.3 3 The Board of Health ruled that Dent's diploma
was not from a reputable medical school as intended by the statute.
Dent was ultimately fined and enjoined from continuing to practice
medicine.
Dent appealed to the Supreme Court arguing that the State had
denied him his property right to practice his profession without due
process of law and due compensation. The Court held that individu-
als have a right "to follow any lawful calling, business, or profes-
sion" but this right had to yield to state imposed conditions for
the protection of society.
34
Because States are to provide for the general welfare,
States are authorized to prescribe all "regulations as in its
judgment will secure or tend to secure them against the conse-
quences of ignorance and incapacity, as well as of deception
and fraud. 3 5 The balancing point against which the interest of
the individual was leveraged against the interest of the State
was to be set by a reasonable analysis of the facts of the case.
Accordingly, a State was authorized under its police power to
restrict an individual's right to practice medicine, unless the re-
striction bore no relationship to the practice of medicine. 36 Ac-
cordingly, the Court upheld Dent's conviction. 37
32 Id. at 115-17.33 Id. at 118.
34 Id. at 121.35 Richards, supra note 21, at 217.36 Dent, 129 U.S. at 114.
37 Dent and its progeny concern a State's authority to limit an individual's
entry into the medical profession. If a State acts to limit a licensed practitioner by
suspension, revocation, or non-renewal, greater scrutiny is placed on the State's ac-
tion. Under such situations, the State's authority is limited by State's administrative
procedure act and constitutional limits placed on state actors. Id. at 218-19; Cf. Phy-
sician Licenses May Be Revoked Without Appellate Court Hearing, CAL. HEALTH L.
MoNrTOR, Apr. 17, 2000, at 3 (observing that recent California legislative changes
have moved to streamline the administrative process to remove incompetent physi-
cians).
246 [Vol. 12:239
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"Despite the enormous expansion of individual rights jurispru-
dence since the early constitutional period, the United States Su-
preme Court has not substantially limited the police power as it re-
lates to public health disease control." 38 Thus in Kansas v.
Hendricks,39 the Court would not release a sexual predator, con-
victed of multiple offenses, because the law upon which the indi-
vidual was convicted was grounded in public health law.40 More-
over, in Pegram v. Herdrich,41 the Supreme Court's most recent
foray into health care, the Court remains deferential to the states in
the field of health care regulation. At issue in this case was the ex-
tent to which the comprehensive federal statute ERISA displaced
traditional state laws. In holding that ERISA does not preempt a
state medical malpractice action against an ERISA plan, the Court
stated that health care was the "subject of traditional state regula-
tion."4
2
C. Limitation of the Scope of Practice
Implicit in the State's power to restrict the practice of
medicine to licensees is the power to define the scope of prac-
tice of the licensee.43 With regard to the validity of the physi-
cian's scope of practice, the law has long been forged from
cases concerning the State's right to regulate narcotics and
abortion.44 The first Supreme Court opinion on this subject was
Minnesota ex rel. Whipple v. Martinson, which concerned a State's
authority to prohibit a physician from dispensing narcotics to a pa-
tient directly.45 Minnesota had passed a law that prohibited a physi-
cian from dispensing narcotics without creating an audit trail.4 In
upholding the State's conviction of a physician for violation of the
act, the Court took an expansive view of "public health and wel-
fare." According to the Martinson court, a State has such a right to
exercise its police power "in the interest of the public health and
welfare, that it is unnecessary to enter upon a discussion of it be-
38 Richards, supra note 21, at 205-06.
3' 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
40 See Richards, supra note 21, at 205-06 (noting that HenaIricks "explicitly
relied on Jacobson v. Massachusetts, a 1905 smallpox immunization case.") (citation
omitted).
41 530 U.S. 211 (2000).
42 Id. at 237.
43 Richards, supra note 21, at 219.
44id.
4' 256 U.S. 41 (1921).
46 See id. at 43-44.
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yond saying that it is too firmly established to be successfully called
in question." 47 Martinson has been reaffirmed by a more recent Su-
preme Court case.
4 8
Whalen v. Roe49 provides another recent and detailed analy-
sis of the validity of a state law governing the scope of prac-
tice. 50 In Whalen, both patients and physicians challenged New
York's use of a public health law51 that required that Schedule
II narcotics be prescribed on serially numbered triplicate pre-
scription forms. These forms contained detailed information
about the patient receiving the drug. One copy of the prescrip-
tion form was sent to the state and the information was entered
into a centralized computer bank. Patients and physicians al-
leged that the public health law was a violation of a patient's
constitutional right to privacy.
The Whalen Court began its analysis by taking notice that
the law in question arose after a special commission was estab-
lished by the state legislature to evaluate the scope of practice
regulations, which found that the prior laws controlling narcot-
ics to be deficient. It also noted that other states (California and
Illinois) had similar statutory schemes to the proposed regula-
tory scheme.52 The Court also reviewed the State's measures to
ensure that a patient's records remained private. Accordingly,
the Court opined that New York's law was "manifestly the
product of an orderly and rational legislative decision. 53 States
have a "vital interest in controlling the distribution of dangerous
drugs. 54 Therefore, the law was "a reasonable exercise of New
York's broad police powers."
55
But the Court also recognized that because dissemination of
such personal information could result in a reluctance of doctors
to prescribe, and patients to use, otherwise appropriate medica-
tions, there was merit in the appellee's assertion that the statute
invades a constitutionally protected 'zone of privacy.' 56 No evi-
47 Id. at 45.
48 See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660,664 (1962).
49429 U.S. 589 (1977).
50 It is axiomatic that case law that upholds scope of practice laws for physi-
cians also upholds scope of practice laws for physician extenders.
51 See Whalen, 429 U.S. at 591.
52 Id. at 592.531 Id. at 597.
54 Id. at 598.
55 Id.56 Id. at 598.
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dence was admitted to suggest that the privacy safeguards
within the statute would be administered improperly. 7 Even
without public disclosure, the Court recognized the right of the
State to receive private information to administrate public
health; accordingly, collecting such information does not
"automatically amount to an impermissible invasion of pri-
vacy. 58 Thus, in upholding the state statute, the Whalen court
placed the review of professional scope of practice statutes on a
rational basis standard, subject only to the balancing of the in-
dividual's privacy.
Balancing individual privacy against a State's interest in
regulating public health also arose in abortion and contraceptive
cases. However, because the physicians are only bystanders in
these cases, which created broad rights of privacy for patients,
the abortion cases only created "very limited rights for physi-
cians."59 In fact, "despite the substantive reality that [these cases
involve the prosecution of a physician] for a crime," in aggre-
gate, these cases stand for the State's authority to limit the
scope of practice of a physician.
60
In Griswold v. Connecticut61 the Court held that a physician
did have standing to challenge a state law that forbids the dis-
semination of contraceptive material. But, in the Court's calcu-
lus, "physicians are involved because the state has restricted the
provision of these particular medical services to physicians." 62 Thus
Griswold implicitly recognizes that States have the right to regulate
the scope of practice of physicians. Subsequent abortion cases have
held that a State may regulate abortion to the same degree that it
regulates any other surgical procedure.63 Finally, Roe v. Wade64 set
57 id. at 601.
5s 1d. at 602.
59 Richards, supra note 21, at 221.60 id.
61 381 U.S. 479, 481 (1965).
62 Richards, supra note 21, at 221.
63 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878 (1992) (stating
that "the State may enact regulations to further the health or safety of a woman seeking
an abortion"); see also Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991) (holding that the Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services regulations, concerning abortion counseling as a
method of family planning, are consistent with the First and Fifth Amendments). The
abortion line of cases has been re-enforced by the courts position that States have the
authority to regulate physician-assisted suicide. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521
U.S. 702 (1997) (holding that prohibition against aiding a suicide does not violate the
Due Process Clause); Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997) (holding that New York
20021
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the upper limit to which a State had authority to limit the scope of
medical practice. Roe held that a State may not impermissibly inter-
fere with a patient's privacy rights. Accordingly, a State cannot act
through a physician to achieve a purpose it was forbidden to do di-
rectly. "Subject to this limitation, physicians have no constitution-
ally protected sphere of practice that is not subject to state regula-
tion. 65
D. Circumvention of State Authority to Regulate Health Care
Delivery
To provide safer but more cost-effective health care, Cross-
ing the Quality Chasm recommends that health care delivery
jettison the traditional approach, centered on autonomous phy-
sician providers, and move toward a collaborative multidiscipli-
nary approach, centered on virtually independent functioning
physician extenders as the primary providers. 66 To achieve this
goal, the Institute of Medicine observes that the existing regula-
tory system stands as an obstacle because licensure and scope of
practice laws "define how the health care workforce is de-
ployed." 67 Such laws have provided physicians with a monopoly
as independent health care providers. The heterogeneous nature
of state licensure and scope of practice laws means that there is
a great deal of variation among the several states in the quality
of medical care that is rendered within its borders.68 Nor do
these state laws provide any assurance that health care providers
maintain their clinical competency after licensure.69 Moreover,
the state licensure and scope of practice laws inhibit the use of
telemedicine 70 and the formation of large multistate provider
statutes outlawing assisted suicide do not infringe fundamental rights nor involve sus-
pect classifications).64 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
65 Richards, supra note 21, at 222.
66 See QUALITY CHASM, supra note 1, at 208-10.67 Id. at 215.
68/d. at 216.
69 Id. at 217.
70 Nicolas P. Terry, Cyber-Malpractice: Legal Exposure for Cybermedicine.
25 AM. J.L. & MED. 327, 327-28 n.7 (1999). Telemedicine "typically refers to tech-
nologies, primarily preconvergence telephony, satellite and video, used to patch geo-
graphical holes in health coverage" that facilitate communication between a physician
and patient. Id. at 327. While a general discussion of telemedicine is beyond the scope
of this communication, notice is taken that the complexity of telemedicine itself pro-
vides a strong argument for the implementation of enterprise liability.
[Vol. 12:239
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groups, both of which the Institute of Medicine believes are
necessary for cost-effective health care.71
Thus, it is not a surprise that Crossing the Quality Chasm
calls for the unification of state health care provider licensure
and scope of practice law in order to provide for a predictable
cost-efficient quality medical care.7 2 One approach to this prob-
lem would be to have a nationally uniform scope of practice
act.73 Alternatively, the country could move toward a mutual
recognition model of state physician-extender licensure, in a
manor analogous to how the country treats driver's license re-
quirements. Regardless of how the state provider licensure and
practice acts are modified, the Institute of Medicine believes
that they should be modified with an eye towards uniformity,
facilitating technologic (computer) innovation and assuring that
health care providers possess a minimum level of competence
throughout their professional careers. However, for its part, the
Institute of Medicine stated that it would be premature for it to
comment on a specific approach to modernizing state health
care regulation.75
Uniformity of laws, whether the laws concern the sale of
goods or securities, facilitate transactions, thereby reducing
costs and providing a stable frame of reference for evaluating a
transaction. There is no reason to believe that medical transac-
tions behave differently. Hence, there is no question that uni-
formity of the laws governing the licensure of physicians and
physician providers, that liberalize the scope of practice of phy-
sician providers, would go a long way towards providing more
cost effective health care. But the preliminary question that
Crossing the Quality Chasm sidesteps, with its comment that it
would be premature of the Institute of Medicine to comment on
71 QUALITY CHASM, supra note 1, at 207-20.72 Id. at 215.
73 See id. (citing THE PEv PROF'L COMM'N, CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN
HEALTH PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION AND WORKFORCE REFORM (1993)); see also
FED'N OF STATE MED. BOARDS, MAINTAINING STATE-BASED MEDICAL LICENSURE
AND DISCIPLINE: A BLUEPRINT FOR UNIFORM AND EFFECTIVE REGULATION OF THE
MEDICAL PROFESSION (1998) (discussing recommendations for uniform standards for
the effective regulation of the medical profession), at http://www.fsmb.orgluniform.
htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2002).
74 See To ERR Is HUMAN, supra note 2, at 142.
75 QUALITY CHASM, supra note 1, at 202.
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a specific unification process, 76 is just how is this uniformity to
be achieved?
The review of state licensure and the scope of practice acts
demonstrates that the place of health care delivery regulation is
firmly in the hands of the state governments. The States set the
quality of medical care providers within their boundaries ac-
cording to their fiscal resources and the needs of their populace.
States adjust the quality of medical care available in turn by ad-
justing the state licensing and scope of practice laws. Under the
present system, if a State believed that quality of medical care
was sub-optimal, due to a lack of physician extenders, the State
could liberalize their licensing laws to attract physician extend-
ers. Conversely, if a State perceived that it had an abundance of
physician providers, it could heighten the requirements to ob-
tain or maintain a medical license. Given the plurality of finan-
cial wherewithal of the States and the diversity of the patient
population throughout the country, it is difficult to believe that
the States will simply agree to unify their licensure and scope of
practice acts.
Given that the States regulate medicine under authority of
their police power, the federal government is limited in how it
can implement the Institute of Medicine's recommendations to
unify the medical licensure and provider scope of practice acts.
Clearly, the federal government lacks the authority to unify
medical licensure and scope of practice acts by fiat.77 Rather,
the federal government could unify the state medical licensure
and scope of practice acts to facilitate health care delivery using
76 Id.
77 See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 749 (1999) (stating that the power to use
a State's own legal apparatus against itself is the power "to commandeer the entire
political machinery of the State against its will and at the behest of individuals");
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992) (holding that the federal gov-
ernment cannot compel States to enact or administer federal regulatory programs,
such that the State would have to provide for the disposal of radioactive waste within
its borders). The federal government's usurpation of a State's traditional authority to
regulate medicine and public health has already been attempted. The Health Security
Act, H.R. 3600, 103d Cong., § 1161 (1993), was without question, intended to ex-
pand the scope of practice of physician extender by preempting state licensure and
scope of practice acts: "No State may, through licensure or otherwise, restrict the
practice of any class of health professionals beyond what is justified by the skills and
training of such professionals."
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78vitw poetathe more cost efficient physician extenders, via two potential
mechanisms: under the authority of the Commerce Clause, or by
conditional payments for medical services.
Congress has the power to regulate interstate commerce.
79
Potentially, as telemedicine becomes big business, 80 the federal
government could deem the practice of medicine to be com-
merce. Such a frontal assault on state licensure laws could be
justified because such laws act as a trade barrier. 81 Congress has
used the Commerce Clause to remove state safety regulations
that hindered the nation's commerce in the past.82 However,
such an assault on the politically sensitive subject of the regula-
tion of medicine appears unlikely.
Rather, the federal government would more likely unify the
state medical licensure and the scope of practice regulations
based on financial incentives. 83 Presently the federal govern-
ment pays directly, or indirectly, a large part of all health care
costs. "Thus, the federal government is in a strong negotiating
position to leverage the adoption of uniform health care regula-
tions. The government has already taken steps to provide qual-
ity and cost effective medical care for Medicare patients by
promulgating the Hospital Conditions of Participation in Medi-
78 See Chris L. Gore, A Physician's Liability for Mistakes of a Physician As-
sistant, 21 J. LEGAL MED. 125, 127-28 (2000) (discussing the various arguments that
justify expanding physician extenders' roles).79 U.S. CONST. art. I '§ 8, cl. 3.
80 It is probably only a matter of time before a Fortune 500 company like
Time-Warner or Sprint enters the telemedicine market to capture market share for
Roadrunner or ION, the high speed communication conduit products of the two com-
panies respectively.
81 Cf Susan E. Volkert, Telemedicine: RXfor the Future of Health Care, 6
MICH. TELLECOMM. & TECH. L. Rnv. 147, 169 (2000) (noting that "many states'
physician licensing boards have placed even more restrictions on consultations, mak-
ing routine telemedical consultations impractical if not impossible").
82 See Kassel v. Consol. Freightway Corp. of Del., 450 U.S. 622, 671 (1981)
(ruling that a state truck safety regulation was overly burdensome on interstate com-
merce).
83 See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 205-06 (1987) (stating that the
federal government may condition distribution of federal highway funds on a state's
adoption of a minimum age for the purchase of liquor); see generally Matt Steams,
Lower Limit for Alcohol Becomes Law, KANSAS CITY STAR, June 12, 2001, at Al
(discussing the amount of leverage the federal government has considering the State
of Missouri's recently capitulation to a similar law).
84 See HEALTH CARE DELIVERY, supra note 7, at 373-74 (explaining how the
federal government became a major source of health care funding beginning in the
1960s).
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care Part A.85 Under the condition of participation regulations,
if a hospital wishes to be reimbursed, the hospital will be re-
quired to meet certain conditions set out by Health Care Financ-
ing Administration (HCFA)86 to be a provider institution, re-
gardless of independent accreditation status. HCFA has pro-
posed that patients have the right to receive health care in "a
safe setting. '' 87 Accordingly, pursuant to the proposed regula-
tions, hospitals are to monitor the delivery of health care pro-
viders of all types. In essence, what HCFA is mandating, under
conditions of participation, is that hospitals police their health
care providers. HCFA has privately suggested that a hospital's
failure to monitor and implement safety as a condition of par-
ticipation will result in the loss of that institution's provider
status.88 The threat of the loss of provider status, in turn, will be
a major incentive for hospitals to report unsafe physicians. 89
Similarly, to encourage cost effective health care, the federal
government has taken steps to encourage the use of physician
extenders. A physician may under certain circumstances, "bill
Medicare for services rendered by certain types of physician
extenders." 90 But to get this increased remuneration, HCFA re-
85 Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Hospital Conditions of Participation;
Provider Agreements and Supplier Approval, 62 Fed. Reg. 66,726 (Dec. 19, 1997) (to
be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 416, 482, 485 & 489).
86 The agency was recently renamed Center for Medicare and Medicaid
Services. For purposes of uniformity, this article will use the old name.
87 Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Religious Nonmedical Health Care
Institutions and Advance Directives, 64 Fed. Reg 67,028, 67,032 (Nov. 30, 1999) (to
be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 403, 412, 431, 440, 442, 446, 456, 488 & 489). Interest-
ingly, this rule was announced in tandem with the Institution of Medicine's report on
medical errors.
88 Letter from Pete Enko, Esq., Seigfried, Bingham, Levy, Selzer, & Gee,
Kansas City, Mo., to Thomas McLean (Apr. 2001) (on file with author).
89 More than ever, a hospital cannot afford to lose the revenue stream that is
associated with being a Medicare provider. See, e.g., Bruce Japsen, Financial Hem-
orrhage: Hospitals Serving the Poor Are Bleeding Red Ink as the Uninsured's Ranks
Grow, Health-Care Costs Climb and More Government Cutbacks Loom, CHI. TRIB.,
Apr. 8, 2001, at Cl ("Hospital revenue was squeezed through much of the 1990s as
managed care expanded. The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 reduced federal outlays.
Now, the Bush administration is proposing to cut all but $20 million of a $140 mil-
lion program linking the uninsured to hospitals and other providers.").
90 Paul R. DeMuro & John D. Whipple, Government's Current Compliance
Initiatives - 1999, in HEALTH CARE FRAUD & ABUSE: How TO NAVIGATE THE COM-
PLIANCE PROCESS 13 (1999) (citing Medicare Carriers Manual § 2050, which states
-that the medical service "(i) provided by the physician extender must be an integral
part of a physician's diagnosis or treatment; (ii) provided must be under the 'direct
supervision' of a physician (i.e., the physician must be present in the office suite and
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quires a "physician supervision requirement for anesthetists in
Medicare cases."
91
In short, while Crossing the Quality Chasm has opined that
the most significant barrier to unitizing cost effective physician
extenders is the patchwork of state licensure and scope of prac-
tice acts, unification of these laws is not insurmountable.
Rather, the federal government, as the largest purchaser of
health care service, is in a position to facilitate the liberalization
of physician extender's scope of practice through its reim-
bursement policies. However, because of the disparate educa-
tional levels between physicians and physician extenders, if
physician extenders are to increase their scope of practice inde-
pendent of physicians, then it becomes appropriate to reconsider
the legal standards by which the medical care as provided by
physician extenders is judged.
E. The Potential Opposition by Organized Medicine
Before contemplating the legal standards for physician ex-
tenders, comment is appropriate concerning what opposition the
Institute of Medicine and the federal government might encoun-
ter from organized medicine. Clearly, liberalizing the scope of
practice acts for physician extenders will erode the monopolistic
hold that physician have on health care delivery; consequently a
shift to physician extenders realistically translates to less need
for physicians. As physician are displaced from the workplace
and physician income falls, the American Medical Association
(AMA) will certainly have something to say concerning the
shift to a physician extender-based health care system.
Unfortunately for physicians, the AMA will likely have lit-
tle say because the AMA is largely unprepared and/or may be
precluded from vigorously challenging a move to a physician
extender based health care delivery system. The AMA has con-
tradictory policies when it comes to willingness to be subservi-
immediately available to provide assistance and direction throughout the time the
physician extender is performing the services); (iii) must be performed by an em-
ployee of the supervising physician or such physician's affiliated medical group (i.e.,
the physician extender must be employed by the supervising physician or his medical
group, or leased by such person or entity); and (iv) must be something ordinarily
done in a physician's office or clinic").
91 Elliott B. Oppenheim, MedBytes, MED. MALPRACTICE L. & STRATEGY,
Aug., 2000, at 9.
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ent to the government.92 A search of the AMA's constitution,
ethical rules, and policies failed to reveal any statements con-
cerning physician extenders except to oppose the right of the
physician extenders to receive direct reimbursement. 93 In addi-
tion, the AMA through its subsidiary the National Patient Safety
Foundation,94 has already signaled its support of the direction
that the Institute of Medicine is taking in a press release on the
Internet, issued just two weeks after To Err is Human was pub-
lished. Moreover, man, of the AMA's positions on health care
have been self-serving 95 or actually play into the hands of the
proponents of physician extenders. 6 Thus it is unlikely that any
92 The American Medical Association's policies can be viewed online at
http:llwww.ama-assn.orglapps/pf-online/pf_online. Compare AM. MED. Ass'N, H-
205.997, AMA STATEMENT ON VOLUNTARY HEALTH PLANNING (2001) (stating "[tihe
protection of the public welfare is properly a concern of government and activities to
protect the public may be implemented in a variety of ways. However, local volun-
tary health planning is a creative process and, therefore, should not include the use of
regulatory sanctions"), with AM. MED. Ass'N, H-160.998, HEALTH CARE (2001)
(stating that "[t]he AMA believes that the medical profession will see to it that every
person receives the best available medical care regardless of his ability to pay, and it
further believes that the profession will render that care according to the system it
believes is in the public interest; and that it will not be a willing party to implement-
ing any system which we believe to be detrimental to the public welfare").
9 AM. MED. Ass'N, H-35.993, OPPOSITION TO DIRECT MEDICARE PAYMENTS
FOR PHYSICIAN EXTENDERS (2001), available at http://www.ama-assn.org/apps/pfL
online/pf_ online (stating that "[olur AMA reaffirms its opposition to any legislation
or program which would provide for Medicare payments directly to physician ex-
tenders, or payment for physician extender services not provided under the supervi-
sion and direction of a physician").
94 The National Patient Safety Foundation, a nonprofit organization, was
formed in 1997 as a collaborative effort between the American Medical Association,
CNA HealthPro, and 3M. The National Patient Foundation is in the AMA's Chicago
headquarters.For more information see the organization's web site at http://www.
npsf. or. In recent years the AMA has amended its ethical cannons to allow physi-
cians to unionize. Sarah A. Klein, The Third Time Is the Charm for a Call by the
AMA House of Delegates that the Association Form a National Labor Organization
Representing Physicians, AMNEws,. July 5, 1999, available at http://www.ama-
assn.org/sci-pubs/amnews/ pick_99/pr10705.htm#top. It also allows physicians to
run a retail sales operation from their office. See Diane M. Gianelli, Ethics Council
Revisits Office-Based Product Sales: CEJA's Latest Take on the Sale of Health-
Related Products from Physician Offices Includes New Due Diligence and Disclosure
Responsibilities, AM. MED. NEws, June 7, 1999, at http://www.ama-assn.org/sci-
pubs/ amnews/pick_99annaO607.htm. While the AMA can justify both of these
modifications under the pretext of patient benefit, the subtext unmistakably denotes
subordination of patient interest to preserve physician's income.
96 One example is the fact that doctors want to work only a limited number of
hours per week, which provides a strong argument for use of physician extenders. See
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opposition by the AMA to the changing landscape of health care
providers will be effective.
IV. LEGAL STANDARDS FOR PHYSICIAN EXTENDERS
The rationale behind increasing utilization of physician ex-
tenders is that physician extenders "lower cost of providing
health care, reduce[ ] physician stress, higher levels of patient
satisfaction, and improve[ ] quality of care resulting from the
team approach., 97 Physician extenders exist to enable physi-
cians "to delegate certain health tasks to physician assistants
where such delegation is consistent with the health and welfare
of the patient and is conducted at the direction of and under the
responsible supervision of the physician." 98 This suggests that at
the very least, society views physician extenders as subordinate
to physicians.
A. Differentiating Physicians and Physician Extenders
To be a physician, one must obtain a doctorate level of
training. Physicians must not only attend four years of college
but must also attend an accredited medical school for four years
of additional postgraduate education. To receive a license to
practice medicine, a physician must work under supervision for
an additional year as an intern and then pass a licensing exami-
nation.
In the present marketplace, if a physician is to have any
hope of reasonable remuneration, the physician needs to achieve
the status of "board certification." To become board certified, a
physician has to attend an accredited residence program for an
additional two to six years (depending on the specialty) of train-
ing to become board eligible. A board certification examination
Jay Greene, Petition Asks OSHA to Limit Resident Work Hours, AM. MED. NEws,
May 21, 2001, at http:/www.ama-assn.orglsci-pubs/anews/pick-Ol/prsaO521.htm.
This is because, as the physicians must recognize, disease-processes operate twenty-
four hours per day. Thus, if the doctors want time off, the Institute of Medicine would
argue that liberalization of physician extender's scope of practice would provide a
cost effective solution to this physician's request.
97 Patrick Knott & Kathleen Ruroede, One Solution for Managing Risks Dur-
ing Cutbacks in Residency Training Programs, 11 RISK: HEALTH, SAFETY & ENV'T
35, 39 (2000) While evidence exists to the contrary for each of these arguments, for
the purposes of this article, all are assumed to be true.
98 Gore, supra note 78, at 125 (citing Illinois Physician Assistant Act of 1987,
225 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 95/1 (West 1998)).
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is given to board eligible candidates anywhere from six months
to two years after the completion of residency. In some special-
ties (e.g., general surgery), the applicant for board certification
must pass not only a written qualifying examination but also an
oral certification examination. 99 In short, to become board certi-
fied in any field, a physician must obtain at least seven years of
training after completing college.
Board certification has been likened "to state licensure: At
one point in time, an individual has passed a general examina-
tion testing minimum competence; generally, no retesting is re-
quired to ascertain continuing competence or skill in newly de-
veloped procedures."'' 00 While "board certification should not be
the sole criteria for assuring patient safety,"' 01 it is a standard of
achievement that is recognized nationally.t0 2 However, since the
mid-1980s, board certification in many fields including internal
medicine and general surgery was granted conditionally on the
physician engaging in lifelong contiguous medical education
(CME). t0 3 To maintain their status as being "board certified,"
physicians must demonstrate that their education remains up to
date by going through recertification every ten years. Recently,
the American Board of Internal Medicine (ABIM) has decided
that this in not enough. The "publics' growing demand for phy-
sician accountability'' 4 coupled with the quickened pace of
99 Caution should be exercised when evaluating the "title 'board certified'
because it can lead to a false sense of security regarding competence." Medical Board
of California, CAL. REG. L. REP., Summer 1999, at 23, 30. I concur. In this article
board certified implies only certification by one of the members of the American
Board of Medical Examiners. For a discussion of other attempts to provide a title
independent of substance, see Thomas R. Russell, From My Perspective, 86 BULL.
AM. C. OF SURGEONS 3 (2001) (discussing a proposed pseudo-board certification in
"dermatology surgery"). The American College of Surgeons opposes this proposal.
Id.
1oD Medical Board of California, supra note 99, at 30.
'01 Id. at 31.
102 See Brian P. Fitzgerald, Can the Pattern Jury Instruction on Medical Mal-
practice Be Revised to Reflect the Law More Accurately?, 71 N.Y. ST. B.J., Nov.
1999, at 32, 34 (stating that board certification "implies a greater degree of knowl-
edge, skill and ability, regardless of locality").
103 Continuing medical education is completely analogous to continuing legal
education, with the exception that physicians are generally required more hours than
their attorney counter parts.
104 Rebecca A. Clay, ABIM Revises Recertificatioin Requirements to Promote
Continuous Professional Development. 30 CARDIOLOGY 1, 1 (2001) see also Wallace
P. Ritchie, Jr., The Measurement of Competence: Current Plans and Future Initia-
tives of the American Board of Surgery, 86 BULL. AM. C. OF SURGEONS 10, 11 (2001)
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medical advances necessitates the institution of "continuous
professional development."' 5 By 2004, the ABIM plans to in-
stitute a ten-year cycle of professional education involving self-
testing, patient and peer group feedback, and formal recertifica-
tion and credentialing.10 6
In contrast to the arduous formal training of a physician,
which exceeds the formal training of all other professions, to be
a physician extender, all that one must achieve is a masters de-
gree level of training. Certified registered nurse anesthetists
(CRNAs) "complete a four-year baccalaureate program in nurs-
ing, then a nursing license, followed by a minimum twenty-four
months of additional training in the delivery of anesthesia."'10 7
CRNAs must also "pass a rigid certification exam in anesthe-
sia." 10 8 Physician assistants "receive their training in accredited
programs that matriculate anywhere from twelve months to
forty-two months, depending on the state."10 9 Advance Practice
Nurses (APNs) 110 must "have advanced training of nine months
to two years beyond the registered nurse (RN) degree. To have
"independent prescribing authority, approximately thirty 'con-
tact hours' in pharmacological management, ten of which must
be in 'pure pharmacology,' are mandated."' 11 Midwifery is also
a graduate level specialty. 112
Physician extenders, unlike physicians, have no formal
postgraduate training. Physician extenders do not have to com-
plete an internship or residency program. While there is some
state-to-state variability, a physician extender generally only
(indicating that the same process is to be initiated to maintain board certification in
general surgery).
105 Clay, supra note 104, at 1; Ritchie, supra note 104, at 11.
106 Clay, supra note 104, at 1, 27.
107 Jerry Cromwell, Barriers to Achieving a Cost-Effective Workforce Mix:
Lessons from Anesthesiology, 24 J. HEALTH POL, POL'Y & L. 1331, 1332 (1999).
'0' Id. at 1354.
109 Joseph Mark Saponaro, Note, Determining the Immunity "Measuring
Stick": The Impact of the Health Care Quality Improvement Act and Antitrust Laws
on Immunity Aspects of Granting Privileges to Physician Assistants, 47 CLEVE. ST. L.
REv. 115, 122 (1999).
110 In some locations APNs are referred to by the appellation of "nurse clini-
cian."
111 James L.J. Nuzzo, Independent Prescribing Authority of Advanced Prac-
tice Nurses: A Threat to the Public Health?, 53 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 35, 43 (1998).
112 See generally Sweeney v. Athens Reg'l Med. Ctr., 709 F. Supp. 1563
(M.D. Ga. 1989) (noting that plaintiff held a degree in nurse-midwifery from a
graduate school).
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needs to graduate from an accredited nursing program and
achieve a passing score on the licensing exam to begin prac-
tice.' 3 However, some States require that their physician ex-
tenders, like their physicians, be of "good moral character."''
4
Importantly, beyond licensure, there is no objective measure to
assess the competency of a physician extender.'
15
Despite both a significant difference in education and docu-
mented evidence of competency, some commentators have
asserted that physician extenders receive sufficient training to
permit "competent diagnosis and treatment of patients at a level
equal to a licensed physician." 1' 6 Advocates of physician ex-
tenders assert that "'no study" has ever shown any significant
difference in the quality of anesthesia care provided by nurse
anesthetists and anesthesiologists." '" 7 Like all groups of profes-
sionals, some physicians are excellent and some are marginal.
Similarly, some physician extenders are excellent and have
greater clinical acumen than the physician supervising them,
while some physician extenders are marginal. Thus, there is no
question that there is considerable overlap between physicians
and physician extenders with regard to individual intelligence,
diligence and humanity. Because of this wide intergroup vari-
ability in quality, it is not surprising that a statistically signifi-
cant difference between physicians and physician extenders has
not been demonstrated.' 18
However, to conclude that the care rendered by the average
physician is the same as the care rendered by the average physi-
cian extender is, at best, naive. There is no a priori reason to
believe that a health care provider vested with a postdoctoral
level of education (a physician with board certification) pro-
duces the same quality of work product as a health care provider
vested with only a masters degree level of education (a physi-
cian extender). In fact, to hold to the contrary (that physician
extenders provide the same quality of care as physicians) is il-
113 Gore, supra note 78, at 127.
14 1d.
115 See Michael H. Cohen, The Risk of Malpractice Liability in Credentialing
Complementary and Alternative Medical Providers, 42 ORANGE CouNTY LAWYER,
Apr. 2000, at 16, 17 (referring to chiropractic board certification).
116 Gore, supra note 78, at 127-28.
117 Oppenheim, supra note 91, at 9 (quoting Jan Steward, president of the
American Association of Nurse Anesthetists).
118 See generally STANTON A. GLANTZ, PRIMER OF BIOSTATISTnCS (1981) (ex-
amining how to test for differences between groups).
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logical for two reasons. If it were true, society would no longer
have any incentive to provide health care education beyond the
masters degree level; and second, there would be no incentive
for individuals to invest in the additional years required to be-
come a physician. Moreover, to conclude the quality of the
work product of a physician extender is the same as a physi-
cian's work product would be analogous to asserting that the
quality of the work product of a paralegal is same as an attor-
ney's work product.
1 9
B. A Differential Legal Standard for Physicians and Physician
Extenders
Despite the self-serving rhetoric of the physician extender
community, a profound difference in the quality of care exists
between patients treated by a physician and patients treated by a
physician extender. 120 Accordingly, physicians and physician
extenders are held to different standards of care. 121 Thus, a dif-
119 In addition to the intuitive nature that the work product of a physician
extender would not be equivalent to that of a physician work product, there are sev-
eral other lines of evidence that suggest that this assertion is true. Despite the U.S.
Military's extensive experience employing physician extenders, "significant" quality
of care issues remain. Discussion with Col. Charles Van Way, M.D. (Mar. 2001).
This is in part because the physician extenders do well with if a healthy patient has
only one problem like a broken leg, but the quality of care deteriorates as the patient
becomes sicker and the medical problems become more complex. Similarly, while it
appears that fifty percent of all medical errors are preventable is a consistent finding,
a recent publication from England has documented that the majority of preventable
errors occur not in the operating room. Instead, "ward-based procedures were due to
poor technique and poor monitoring of unsupervised junior staff." Graham Neale et
al., Exploring the Causes of Adverse Events in HNS Hospital Practice, 94 J. ROY.
Soc'Y MED. 322, 325 (2001). This suggests that the majority of preventable errors are
not made by the well-trained physician but rather the less well-trained health care
providers. Finally, the mere fact that physician extenders are granted by the law a
different standard of care than their physician counterparts is a tacit acknowledge-
ment by the legal community that the quality of care of the physician extender is
lower than that of the quality of care provided by the physician provider.
120 See Richards, supra note 21, at 235.
For example, there is no "corporate practice of nursing" doctrine because
the courts have always assumed that nurses will be under the direction of
physicians, and that physicians are subject to corporate practice bans. An-
other example is the learned intermediary doctrine for prescription drugs.
The courts do not accept that NPPs are learned intermediaries.
Id. (citations omitted).
121 See Gore, supra note 78, at 130 (discussing different standards of care for
physician assistants); Phyllis Coleman & Ronald A. Shellow, Extending Physician's
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ferent 'measuring stick' needs to be used to evaluate physician
and physician extenders. 122 The deferential treatment provided
by the courts is perhaps the best evidence that the quality of
care rendered by physician extenders in below that of physi-
cians. If physician extenders provided the same quality of care,
there would be no reason to provide the physician extenders
with different treatment.
Physicians must render to patients a standard of care that
another reasonably prudent physician would provide under the
same or similar circumstances. 23 This standard is modified
based on the nature of the physician's practice and the location
of the physician's practice. If the physician is a specialist, then
that physician will owe his or her patient a greater degree of
care. 24 A cardiologist must exercise greater clinical acumen
when treating a patient with angina than a family practitioner.
Conversely, if the physician practices in a rural area, practically
speaking, the degree of care owed to a patient is not as onerous
because rural areas usually are not required to possess the new-
est machinery and equipment.
125
Because physician extenders must render patients a stan-
dard of care that another reasonably prudent physician extender
would provide under the same or similar circumstances, 126 in a
medical malpractice action (just like a physician), the plaintiff
must demonstrate that the physician extender breached the stan-
Standard of Care to Non-Physician Prescribers: The Rx for Protecting Patients, 35
IDAHO L. REV. 37, 72 (1998) (same).
122 Saponaro, supra note 109, at 136 (referring to competition for work place
position between MDs and non-MD providers).
123 See Boyce v. United States, 942 F. Supp. 1220-25 (E.D. Mo. 1996); Alef
v. Alta Bates Hosp., 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 900, 904 (Ca. Ct. App. 1992).
124 See, e.g., Johnson v. Westfield Mem'l Hosp., 710 N.Y.S.2d 862, 863 (Sup.
Ct. 2000) (holding that as a specialist, an ophthalmologist is to be held to a higher
standard of care than an average physician).
125 The move away from the locality rule, which held physicians to different
standard of care regarding skill has been described as follows:
[J]urisdictions abandoned the locality rule in favor of a national standard of
care theoretically applicable anywhere in the country. The Supreme Court
of Missouri abandoned the locality rule in favor of the national standard in
the 1972 case of Gridley v. Johnson. The practical effect of this change in
the law was to allow for the use of medical experts from other jurisdic-
tions. This change in the law clearly had the result of blunting the effect of
"the so-called 'conspiracy of silence' among physicians.
Glenn E. Bradford, The "Respectable Minority" Doctrine in Missouri Medical Neg-
ligence Law, J. Mo. B., Nov.-Dec. 2000, at 326, 326-27.
126 See Boyce, 942 F. Supp. at 1225; Alef, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 904.
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dard of care owed to the patient.127 Although Coleman and Shel-
low assert that physician extenders "can be held to the physician
standard of care when performing tasks traditionally reserved to
medical doctors," 128 the rule for physician extenders remains
that they must only provide a level of care that another reasona-
bly prudent physician extender would provide under same or
similar conditions. 129 Thus physician extenders provide a lower
standard of care when compared with physician-providers.
130
Also, modification of general rule for physician extender's
standard of care occurs under a different set of conditions than
that for physicians. First, there is no rule of heightened care for
a specialist. Provided that a physician extender is acting within
their prescribed scope of duty, specialization does not exist.
Thus, for example, a CRNA cannot specialize in cardiac anes-
thesia. If a CRNA provides anesthesia to a cardiac patient, the
standard of care owed to the patient is only that care of another
reasonable CRNA provider under the same or similar circum-
stance (providing cardiac anesthesia). Second, while the locality
modification to a physician's standard of care has largely been
abandoned, courts remain divided as to whether this standard of
care for a physician extender is local or national in nature.131 In
part, the perpetuation of the locality rule for physician extenders
127 See Bradford v. Alexander, 886 S.W.2d 394, 396 (Tex. App. 1994) (pro-
viding elements of a medical malpractice action).
128 Coleman & Shellow, supra note 121, at 73. While the authors cite cases
that could be construed as setting the standard of care for physician extenders at the
same level as physicians, these cases are sui generi in nature. See Fein v. Permanente
Med. Group, 695 P.2d 665, 674 (Cal. 1985) (en banc) (holding a physician extender,
in this case a nurse practitioner, to a physician's standard of care was a harmless error
because the jury could not have reasonably found the nurse practitioner negligent
under the physician standard of care without also finding the supervising physician
similarly negligent); see also Cent. Anesthesia Assocs. v. Worthy, 333 S.E.2d 829, -
34 (Ga. 1985) (upholding grant of summary judgment against CRNA for negligence
per se, where CRNA improperly administered anesthesia without authorization or
supervision, contrary to state statute).
129 See Paris v. Kreitz, 331 S.E.2d 234, 247 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985); PROSSER
AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS (W. Page Keeton et al. eds.) § 32 (5th ed. 1984)
(stating "the cumulative effect of all of these rules has meant that the standard of
conduct becomes one of 'good medical practice,' which is to say, what is customary
and usual in the profession").
130 See MacDonald v. United States, 853 F. Supp. 1430, 1438 (M.D. Ga.
1994) (finding that the minimal training required to become a physician's assistant
does not operate as an adequate substitute for the training level of a doctor).
131 See Gore, supra note 78, at 131-32 (discussing various courts' approaches
to the local versus national standard of care argument and concluding it is the "same
or similar locality" standard).
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reflects the heterogeneous conditions under which a physician
extender is employed.1
32
C. Liability Associated with Administration of Physician
Extenders
While variability exists in the degree to which States grant
autonomy to physician extenders, a medical director of some
forM 13 3 must still provide direction to physician extenders.
134
Accordingly, the medical director of a physician extender ac-
crues liability either directly for negligent selection and reten-
tion of an incompetent physician extender, or vicariously under
the doctrines of respondeat superior or the principle of ostensi-
ble agency.
1. Direct Liability: Negligent Selection and Retention of a
Physician Extender
There are only two requirements to become a physician ex-
tender: 1) attainment of a masters level of formal education and
2) passing a state licensing examination. Little, therefore, dis-
tinguishes one physician extender from another, except perhaps
letters of recommendation. 35 Moreover, because there is not a
National Practitioner Data Bank for physician extenders, as
there is for physicians, other than the state-licensing bureau, at
present there is no governmental organization that profiles a
132 While physician extenders must be supervised, the degree of supervision is
highly variable depending on personality of the supervising physician. Use of clini-
cal guidelines and geographic location of the physician extender's practice also influ-
ence the level of care provided by physician extenders.
133 In this capacity, the term "medical director" is used broadly. A medical
director may be a solo practitioner who employs a single extender. At the other end
of the spectrum, a medical director may supervise multiple physician extenders in
non-traditional settings. See Jass v. Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc., 88 F.3d 1482
(7th Cir. 1996) (describing how medical directors supervise nurse physician extend-
ers during utilization review decision making); Murphy v. Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 949
P.2d 530, 536 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997) (illustrating the fact that a medical directors
decision to deny care is a medical decision); State Bd. of Registration for the Healing
Arts v. Fallon, 41 S.W.3d 474,477 (Mo. 2001) (same).
134 See Patricia C. Kuszler, Telemedicine and Integrated Health Care Deliv-
ery: Compounding Malpractice Liability, 25 AM. J.L. & MED. 297, 324 (1999) (noth-
ing that with respect to the patient, the doctor can function both as a provider and "as
the supervisor of the physician extender").
135 Even if the physician extender had a long employment history, checking
with prior employers is unlikely to disclose negative information about the physician
extender.
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physician extender in a like manner comparable to that which is
done with physicians. Perhaps the only absolute rule concerning
physician extenders is that the employer must do its own due
diligence work.136 Thus, until physician extenders are subjected
to the rigors of a more formal education, certification and/or a
central data bank profiling scheme, so that objective criteria is
established to differentiate one physician extender from another,
it is unlikely that there will be any litigation concerning the
negligent selection of physician extenders.
In general, "[a] person conducting an activity through ser-
vants or other agents is subject to liability for harm resulting
from his conduct if he is negligent or reckless ... in the super-
vision of the activity."'137 However, at present, liability for the
negligent supervision of a physician extender turns on specific
state law. Some States require that physician extenders work
under physician supervision, 138 while other States will allow
physician extenders to work under the supervision of a physi-
cian at a geographically remote site.139 To trigger liability for
negligent supervision of a physician extender, a plaintiff must
demonstrate that the lack of supervision is causally linked to the
alleged harm. 140 Thus, "a physician must do more than sign an
order to be liable for a [physician assistant's] acts. The physi-
cian's liability must be derived from a direct act or omission to
act, such as failing to supervise a [physician assistant].' 141 How
much more is required is unclear. However, in one case, the
court made note of a hospital's requirement that proper physi-
cian supervision of an extender contemplates that the physician
136 See SeaRiver Maritime, Inc. v. Indus. Med. Servs., Inc., 983 F. Supp. 1287
(N.D. Cal. 1997) (finding health care provider liable for negligent hiring for failing to
inquire into a physicians qualifications and experience); Voss v. Bridwell, 364 P.2d
955 (Kan. 1961) (holding that physician must exercise due care in the selection of a
resident to provide anesthesia).
137 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 213 (1958).
138 Gore, supra note 78, at 133 (citing CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 3516.5
(West 1990); COLO. REv. STAT. § 12-36-106(5)(b)(I) (1997); GA. CODE ANN. § 43-
34-103(d) (1994); 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. 95/7 (West 1998); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §
1360.31(A)(1) (West 1994); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. I, § 15-301(a) (1994)).
139 Id. (citing NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-1, 107.17(b) (1996); S.D. CODIMD LAWS
§ 36-4A-19(3) (Michie 1999); WASH. REv. CODE § 18.71A.020(2)(b)(ii) (1999)).
'40 Id. at 134.
141 Id. at 129.
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will review more than ten percent of the extender's work prod-
uct. 1
42
2. Vicarious Liability: Respondeat Superior
Because physician extenders are statutorily required to
work under physician supervision, the extenders almost always
stand in an employer-employee relationship with their physician
supervisors.143 This employment relationship forms the basis for
applying respondeat superior liability upon the employer. 144
In order for a plaintiff to successfully sue a physi-
cian on a respondeat superior claim he must show that
the tortfeasor was acting on the physician's orders and
that the physician had a right of control over the tort-
feasor's actions. It is by the right to control the manner
of performance that plaintiffs routinely prove the exis-
tence of an employee-employer relationship. 145
Whether an employment relationship exists therefore turns on
five factors considered in determining the master's degree of
control over a servant: "(1) the selection and engagement of the
servant; (2) the payment of wages; (3) the power to discharge;
(4) the power to control the servant's conduct; and (5) whether
the work is a part of the regular business of the employer."'146
However, because many States have statutes requiring a physi-
cian supervise the extender, there is generally sufficient control
to apply respondeat superior liability.
Two exceptions to the rule that the physician employers
will have respondeat superior liability for the actions of subor-
142 See MacDonald v. United States, 853 F. Supp. 1430, 1438 (M.D. Ga.
1994).
143 The relationship may not however be entirely linear. The physician super-
visor may be a medical director of larger business organization. See Jass v. Prudential
Health Care Plan, Inc., 88 F.3d 1482, 1495 (demonstrating how the supervisor may
be a medical director of a large business organization).
144 See, e.g., James H. Cook, Note, The Legal Status of Physician Extenders in
Iowa: Review, Speculations, and Recommendations, 72 IOWA L. REV. 215, 232
(1986) (noting that if a physician extender is found to be an employee of a physician,
the physician will be liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior).
145 Lynn D. Lisk, A Physician's Respondeat Superior Liability for the Negli-
gent Acts of Other Medical Professionals-When the Captain Goes Down Without
the Ship, 13 U. ARK. LrITLEROCK L. J. 183, 187 (1991) (citation omitted).
146 Gore, supra note 78, at 136 (citing Keitz v. Nat'l Paving & Contracting
Co., 134 A.2d 296, 301 (Md. 1957)).
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dinate physician extenders exist.1 47 The doctrine of Captain of
the Ship provided "patients a theory of recovery for negligent
acts performed by hospitals and staff that were shielded by
charitable immunity. The courts reasoned that physicians and
surgeons were not just the best source for recovery for injured
patients, but more importantly, were the only source of recov-
ery."' 48 The legal importance of this doctrine has waned due to
the abolition of charitable immunity by Darling,149 and the Bor-
rowed Servant Rule, the other major exception to respondeat
superior liability. Under the Borrowed Servant Rule a physician
extender who was "directed or permitted by his master to per-
form services for another may become the servant of [the other
physician] in performing the services." 150 Thus when a physi-
cian directs a hospital employed physician extender, the hospi-
tal's respondeat superior liability is severed under the Borrowed
Servant Rule.151 However, even under the Borrowed Servant
doctrine if the employee physician extender negligently per-
forms a routine clerical act, one that does not require masters-
level training in health care, courts are still willing to find re-
spondeat superior liability.1
52
Notice should be taken that respondeat superior liability
and liability for negligent supervision, in combination, are pow-
erful weapons to provide compensation for worthy patients who
are injured by the negligent acts of a physician extender. If the
conduct of the physician extender is too tightly controlled, the
supervising physician/employer will be vicariously liable under
the doctrine of respondeat superior, but if the conduct of the
physician extender is too loosely controlled, the supervising
physician/employer will be directly liable for negligent supervi-
147 The exceptions to respondeat superior liability are not applicable to certain
nondelegable duties. "As a result of a nondelegable duty, the responsibility or ulti-
mate liability for proper performance of a duty cannot be delegated, although actual
performance of the task required by a nondelegable duty may be done by another."
Id. at 138 (citing Swierczek v. Lynch., 466 N.W.2d 512, 520 (Neb. 1991)). In essence
then, nondelegable duties constitute an exception to the exceptions to respondeat
superior liability.
'48 Id. at 139.
149 See infra, Part V(A)(1).
150 RESTATEMNT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 227 (1957).
151 See Oberzan v. Smith, 869 P.2d 682, 685 (Kan. 1994) (holding that the
doctrine of respondeat superior did not apply to relationship between hospital techni-
cian and radiologist).
152 See Gore, supra note 78, at 138.
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sion.153 However, a patient injured by the negligent act of a
physician extender may still go uncompensated.
154
3. Vicarious Liability: Ostensible Agency
Liability under the doctrine of ostensible agency arises
when: (1) the plaintiff had reasonable belief in agent's author-
ity; or, (2) that such belief was generated by the holding out by
acts or a neglect of the ostensible principal; or, (3) the plaintiff
justifiably relied upon a representation of authority. 155 While
courts have commonly found hospitals vicariously liable for the
negligent conduct of members of the medical staff,156 only a few
cases have been reported that concern ostensible agency liabil-
ity for physician extenders. For the most part, hospitals have not
been found vicariously liable under this doctrine because the
plaintiffs constantly "failed to raise a fact issue on each element
of ostensible agency."'157
There appears to be three reasons why plaintiffs fail to pro-
vide sufficient facts concerning their relationship with a physi-
cian extender to survive summary judgment. First, because phy-
sician extenders ultimately cannot practice without some super-
vision, the use of respondeat superior/negligent supervision
eliminates the need to demonstrate that a hospital or other busi-
ness organization provided an affirmative assertion that the
physician extender was an agent and as such, that the plaintiff s
belief was justified. Second, because a medical malpractice ac-
tion against a physician extender retrospectively reviews the
care given, the plaintiffs testimony contains "would-be as-
sumptions, and 'had I known"' logic. 58 Such arguments under-
cut the plaintiff's credibility and make a demonstration of justi-
153 See id. (discussing the effect of the administrative and clerical act rules on
physician liability).154 See infra, Part IV(D)(1) & Part V(B).
155 See Drennan v. Cmty. Health Inv. Corp., 905 S.W.2d 811, 820 (Tex. App.
1995).
156 Kenneth S. Abraham & Paul C. Weiler, Enterprise Medical Liability and
the Evolution of the American Health Care System, 108 HARv. L. REv. 381, 388
(1994).
157 See e.g., Drennan, 905 S.W.2d at 821 (discussing similarity between this
case and Nicholson v. Mem'l Hosp. System, 722 S.W.2d 746 (Tex. App. 1987),
where plaintiffs had failed to raise a factual issue on each element of ostensible
agency); Accord Lopez v. Cent. Plains Reg'l Hosp., 859 S.W.2d 600, 605 (Tex. App.
1993); Jeffcoat v. Phillips, 534 S.W.2d 168, 172-73 (Tex. App. 1976).
158 Drennan, 905 S.W.2d at 821.
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fiable reliance almost impossible. 159 Finally, because most phy-
sician extenders do not carry professional liability insurance,
plaintiffs attorneys often do not name physician extenders as
defendants. 16
0
D. Limitations in the Current Physician Extender Liability
System
The traditional justification for medical malpractice liabil-
ity, whether it is applied to physicians or physician extenders,
has been the value of corrective justice.161 "Traditionally, con-
trol-and therefore blame-rested with individual physi-
cians." 162 But, as the above discussion on physician extender
liability demonstrates, a "net" of legal theory involving direct
physician extender liability and vicarious liability has been de-
veloped to catch negligent physician extenders and to provide
compensation. But, just as any net has a limited capacity to hold
its contents, the net of liability for physician extenders has a
limited capacity to provide for corrective justice. Specifically,
the current system allows for otherwise worthy patients who
have been injured by negligent physician extender care to go
159 See id. (holding that such 'had I known' testimony amounts to no more
than conjecture or speculation). In granting summary judgment for the defendant, the
Drennan court found that the plaintiff failed to place any material facts in contro-
versy despite the following testimony concerning CRNA Ben Harmon who allegedly
administered anesthesia negligently to a child:
Ben Harman came in to the room while we were there. I remember that he
stood at the'foot of Amy's bed, introduced himself as Ben Harman and told
us that he was going to be putting Amy to sleep and he asked if anyone had
any questions. I do not recall that Amy or any family member asked any
questions.... I had no idea that Highland Hospital was using CRNAs in
the anesthesia department.... No one, including Ben Harman, told me or
Amy or any member of the family, in my presence, that Ben Harman was a
CRNA and not an M.D. anesthesiologist. It was my assumption that he was
a physician. Had anyone told us that he was a CRNA before Amy's sur-
gery, I would have told Sharon Drennan that she should not let a CRNA be
involved in Amy's care and that she should request an M.D. anesthesiolo-
gist to provide the anesthesia care at all times.
Id.
160 Interview with Karolyn M. Scanlon, underwriter, Kansas Medical Mutual
Insurance Company, Topeka, Kansas (April 18, 2001). The reason for why physician
extenders often go "bare" with respect to insurance coverage is explained further in
the next subsection.
161 Abraham & Weiler, supra note 156, at 399.
162 William M. Sage, Enterprise Liability and the Emerging Managed Health
Care System, LAW & CONTEMp. PROBS., Spring 1997, at 159, 195.
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uncompensated when the negligence occurs within the scope of
the underinsured physician extender.
1. Liability for Negligent Medical Care: Within the Scope of a
Physician Extender and Outside of Direct/Continuous Physician
Supervision Belongs Exclusively to the Physician Extender
Oberzan v. Smith163 illustrates that when physician extend-
ers provide a medical service that is within the scope of their
practice, liability for medical negligence can be as personal as it
is for physicians. In need of a diagnostic barium enema, Kathe-
rine Oberzan went to Maude Norton Memorial Hospital where
an x-ray technician, who was nominally under the supervision
of a staff radiologist, negligently inserted the enema catheter
and perforated Katherine's rectum. 164 At the time Katherine's
rectum was perforated, the radiologist was not in the room. It
was uncontroverted that the x-ray technician was trained to in-
sert the enema catheter and that when the catheter was inserted,
the instrument was in the exclusive control of the technician.
The trial court dismissed the action against the radiologist be-
cause the technician was an employee of the hospital and thus,
respondeat superior liability did not exist.165
On appeal, the plaintiff demurred and asserted that the ra-
diologist should be liable under the doctrine of 'captain of the
ship. ' 166 But, the court observed that the key to liability was an
agency relationship, which requires a factual demonstration that
the principle has the ability to control the agent.' 67 Unfortu-
nately, the plaintiff could not demonstrate the prerequisite con-
trol to trigger an agency relation. The plaintiff admitted that
preparation of the patient, including the insertion of the cathe-
ter, was not routinely done under the direct (visual) supervision
of the radiologist. 168 Moreover, the plaintiff could not cite any
statute that imposed a duty on the radiologist to directly super-
vise the technician. Because the plaintiff could not demonstrate
that radiologist was in a position to control the technician's ac-
tions, the court upheld the trial court's grant of summary judg-
ment against the radiologist.
163 869 P.2d 682 (Kan. 1994).
'64 Id. at 683-84.
'65 Id. at 684.
166 id.
167 Id. at 685.
168 Id. at 685.
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It is important to realize that the majority of physician ex-
tenders practice their art and provide medical service in same
manner as the radiology technician in Oberzan: within the scope
of their practice, but out of direct visual and auditory control of
the physician, who is nominally responsible for the care that is
rendered. For care rendered by physician extenders independent
of direct physician supervision, courts have held that extenders
liability is personal. Thus, cases like Oberzan effectively cut off
otherwise worthy plaintiffs from compensation by anyone other
than individual health care providers. It is in cases like Ober-
zan, that the courts have fashioned the doctrine of corporate li-
ability. 6
9
2. Physician Extenders as a Group Are Under-Insured
The key to understanding Oberzan and physician extender
cases like it requires the application of behavioral economic
theory.170 That is, one must contemplate what drove the plain-
tiffs attorney to doggedly pursue liability against the radiolo-
gist when it would appear that the malpractice case against the
physician extender was straightforward.
Kansas, like other States, exercises its police power by re-
quiring that all health care providers obtain a license to practice
their profession. 17 1 However, while Kansas requires that all
physicians carry medical liability coverage, virtually all physi-
cian extenders are under no obligation to obtain any profes-
sional liability coverage. Specifically, while the insurance code
stipulates that professional liability insurance "shall be main-
tained.., as a condition to rendering professional service as a
health care provider in this state,"1'2 the code then exempts
169 While the doctrine of corporate liability will be discussed further infra Part
IV, consider Denton Reg'l Med. Ctr. v. LaCroix, 947 S.W.2d 941,950-56 (Tex. App.
1997). Denton concerned a misadventure during the delivery of a child. In contrast to
the hospital's policy, which required the supervision of an anesthesiologist, when a
CRNA administered anesthesia, there was no physician at the time the plaintiff was
administered anesthesia. The court held that the hospital was directly liable under the
corporate liability doctrine for injuries caused by the failure of physicians to properly
supervise the certified registered nurse anesthesiologists according to hospital policy.
Id.
170 See Louis Uchitelle, Following the Money, But Also the Mind: Some
Economists Call Behavior a Key, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2001, at C1 (observing the
mantra of the nascent field of behavioral economics is "follow the money").
171 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-2803(a) (1992).
172 Id. § 40-3402(a).
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from the definition of health care providers: physician assis-
tants, podiatrists, optometrists, pharmacists, and advanced prac-
tices nurses. 173 The only physician extenders that are statutorily
required to maintain a professional liability policy in Kansas are
the CRNAs. Therefore, unless a physician extender is conscien-
tious, the physician extender is under no legal obligation to ob-
tain professional liability. 174 Consequently, most physician ex-
tenders are uninsured or at best covered under a global umbrella
policy purchased by the supervising business organization.
175
3. Are Physician Extenders Cost-Effective Health Care
Providers?
The fact that most physician extenders practice caregiving
without professional liability coverage raises the issue of
whether the Institute of Medicine's vision of health care deliv-
ery is realistic. Crossing the Quality Chasm advocates that our
health care delivery system fundamentally change from one
based on autonomous physician practice to a system based on a
collaborative multidisciplinary approach. To accomplish this
goal, the Institute of Medicine advocates that the scope of prac-
tice physician extenders be expanded. 176 Physician extenders, it
is argued, provide medical care as well as physicians and are
more cost effective.
177
However, liberalizing the scope of practice of physician ex-
tenders and providing more health care by physician extenders
only adds another layer of complexity to our health care system.
Added complexity means that there will be more hand-offs and
communication errors because the ultimate decisionmaker, the
physician, will be one step removed from the patient and the
patient will be receiving medical care from less qualified indi-
viduals. 78 "A recent study of intensive care concluded that ad-
verse events were common and that more than one-fourth of
them were due to misunderstandings between hospital staff
members or administrative errors."' 179 The Institute of Medicine
'73 Id. § 40-3401(f).
174 Interview with Karolyn M. Scanlon, supra note 160.
175 Id. As used here "business organization" could be a physician, physician
group, hospital, or insurance company.
176 QuALITY CHAsM, supra note 1, at 210-11.
177 See supra Part IV.
'
78 See supra Part IV.
79 Sage, supra note 162, at 167 n.32.
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itself has recognized that problems with patient care handoffs
are a leading cause of medical errors.180 Therefore, it is reason-
able to conclude, absent evidence to the contrary, that a collabo-
rative multidisciplinary health care delivery system will have at
least as many medical errors (if not more) as the current
autonomous physician-based system.
181
Thus, by merely shifting health care delivery to providers
whose formal training is limited to a masters degree, it is unrea-
sonable to expect that the medical error rate with its intended
consequences of bodily injury will be attenuated. But what will
occur with multidisciplinary health care delivery is that more
patients will receive no compensation when a provider harms a
patient because under the current system physician extenders
are not carrying professional liability insurance. Resolution of
this dilemma will take more than merely amending the state in-
surance codes to mandate physician extenders carry that insur-
ance. Because the insurance industry views physician extenders
as having limited exposure to medical malpractice liability, the
medical malpractice carrier set the physician extender's pre-
mium at a fraction of what they charge their physician counter-
parts for providing the same service. 182 If this perception of
physician extender exposure were to change, which mandating
insurance coverage alone would do, then the medical malprac-
tice carriers would, without question, substantially increase the
premiums of the physician extenders.18 3 As a consequence of
physician extender premiums rising, the extent of physician ex-
tender health care would also increase. This fact has been under
appreciated. 18
4
180 See QUALITY CHASM, supra note 1, at 28 (discussing how care delivery
processes, including handoffs, "slow down the care process and decrease rather than
improve safety").
181 However, as will be discussed infra, if the multidisciplinary team approach
to health care delivery is coupled with adoption of enterprise liability, there will be
financial incentives appropriate to reducing medical errors, even with a greater pro-
portion of health care delivery being provided by physician extenders.
182 Interview with Karolyn M. Scanlon, supra note 160.
183 Id.
184 The fundamental problem of economic analysis is how comprehensive the
scope of review should be. Only limited discussion is available specifically on the
cost benefits of enterprise liability. See Barry R. Furrow, Managed Care Organiza-
tions and Patient Injury: Rethinking Liability, 31 GA. L. REv. 419, 503-04 (1997)
(discussing arguments that justify channeling liability to managed care providers or
hospitals through organizational liability).
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By advocating that individual professional liability insur-
ance be supplanted by either enterprise liability coverage or no-
fault coverage for medical negligence, Crossing the Quality
Chasm implicitly recognizes that shifting to a collaborative
multidiscipline health care delivery system will not completely
reduce medical errors.185 Both have the advantage that they
would provide incentives to reduce medical errors. While a dis-
cussion of no-fault insurance medical liability insurance is
largely beyond the scope of this article, a few comments are in
order.
No-fault insurance does not advance one of the principles
of the Institute of Medicine's error reduction program. No-fault
insurance will not eliminate the "blame game" because no-fault
medical malpractice coverage will necessarily have to deter-
mine who is at fault. 186 To understand why no-fault medical
malpractice coverage must find fault, one has to realize that no-
fault medical malpractice liability coverage will, of necessity,
still dissect all cases of alleged medical malpractice to deter-
mine whether the cause of injury was due to either the underly-
ing disease state or medical negligence. The reason is rather
simple: a medical malpractice liability carrier is not going to be
willing to pay out on a claim where the cause of the injury was
progression of the underlying disease state. 87 In the way of
contrast with no fault automotive insurance, the only form of
large-scale no-fault insurance available in this country, 188 an
independent variable like disease state does not exist. Thus,
even with no-fault medical malpractice coverage, carriers will
continue to defend medical malpractice claims in the same high-
cost manner. 189 While David M. Studdert has predicted modest
185 See QUALrrY CHASM, supra note 1, at 218-19 (noting that enterprise liabil-
ity and no-fault compensation also could produce an environment more conducive to
uncovering and resolving quality problems).
186 McLean, supra note 6.
187 Interview with Karolyn M. Scanlon, supra note 160.
188 No-fault medical malpractice insurance in New Zealand has been plagued
with multiple problems. More information can be found at the Accident Compensa-
tion Corporation's web site at http://www.acc.co.nz and New Zealand's Department
of Labour Accident Insurance web site at http://www.tocover.govt.nz. The Swiss
government, in contemplating a new course for their national health care policy, does
not contemplate provider liability coverage. More information can be at http://www.
swiss-q.org.
189 See Abraham & Weiler, supra note 156 (referring to the fact that it is the
medical malpractice carrier who is on the line in medical malpractice litigation, not
the doctor).
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cost benefits for health care delivery from a shift to no-fault in-
surance, it is unclear from his publication how passively he as-
sumed the medical malpractice carriers would be in future liti-
gation. 190 Clearly, the scope of investigation and vigor that a
party expects to pursue in no-fault litigation will heavily influ-
ence the cost of health care.
191
V. ENTERPRISE LIABILITY: THE MEDICAL SERVICE
INDUSTRY'S ANALOGUE TO PRODUCE LIABILITY
Crossing the Quality Chasm is not the first report to Con-
gress advocating the adoption of enterprise liability, 192 which is
a method to shift liability for adverse events, occurring during
the delivery of health care, from the individual physician to the
business organization that provided the medical service.
193
However, although enterprise liability is conceptually no more
than a natural extension of corporate liability, enterprise liabil-
ity is a slippery concept because of polymorphic definitions.
However, if enterprise liability is defined as a system under
which a business organization that provides a medical service is
the exclusive bearer of liability for all medical negligence,
194
190 See David M. Studdert et al., Beyond Dead Reckoning: Measures of Medi-
cal Injury Burden, Malpractice Litigation, and Alternative Compensation Models
from Utah and Colorado, 33 IND. L. REv. 1643, 1646 (2000); David M. Studdert et
al., Can the United States Afford a "No-Fault" System of Compensation for Medical
Injury?, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1997, at 1, 25-29.
191 Cf PAT MILTON, IN THE BLINK OF AN EYE: THE FBI INVESTIGATION OF
TWA FLIGHT 800 (1999) (demonstrating the difference in the level of investigation
required when a specific causation rather than general causation needs to be demon-
strated). Early on in the investigation of the crash of Flight 800, the National Trans-
portation Safety Board [NTSB] determined that the flight had crashed after a center
fuel tank exploded. The NTSB thought it appropriate at that point to terminate the
investigation, because from its prospective the NTSB only needed to propose im-
prove safety regulations to prevent future similar events. However, the FBI pursuing
a criminal investigation had to know the precise cause of the fuel tank explosion
pushed the NTSB to virtually reconstructing the entire plane. Similarly, no-fault pro-
fessional insurance implicitly assumes that investigation into the ultimate cause of
medical injury can be truncated. However, like the FBI, no-fault medical malpractice
insurance carriers will have a different point of view, which may vitiate the implicit
assumption in David Studdard's calculations. See Studdert et al., supra note 190.
192 See PHYsIcIAN PAYMENT REvIEW COMM'N, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS
at 299 (1994).
193 Sage, supra note 162, at 159; Sharon M. Glenn, Comment, Tort Liability
of Integrated Health Care Delivery Systems: Beyond Enterprise Liability, 29 WAKE
FOREST L. REv. 305, 306-06 (1994).
194 This definition is consistent with other definitions for enterprise liability in
the literature. See infra, Part V(B).
2002]
HEALTH MATRIX
regardless of the provider's status, then enterprise liability is the
superior method by which to assign liability if physician ex-
tenders are to be granted greater autonomy. Moreover, by focus-
ing all litigation against a single party, it is hoped that enter-
prise liability is a more just and cost efficient system than the
traditional indemnity medical malpractice system." 195 Herein,
however, we are only concerned with the concept, and not the
details of enterprise liability. 196
A. Origins of Enterprise Liability
Traditionally, liability for medical malpractice was personal.
Because physicians were viewed as autonomous decisionmak-
ers, 197 and business organizations were prohibited by statute
from the practice of medicine, 198 the hospital and other business
organizations were initially viewed as being a step removed
from patient care. Accordingly, hospitals and other business or-
ganizations could not be found liable for any patient harm. 199
Moreover, hospitals traditionally were considered to have re-
ceived an implied waiver of immunity from liability by provid-
ing medical treatment, without remuneration, under the doctrine
195 See E. Haavi Morreim, Playing Doctor: Corporate Medical Practice and
Medical Malpractice, 32 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 939, 973 (1999) (discussing that
under an enterprise liability theory, health care plans would bear all liability, includ-
ing medical malpractice because they are the "best locus of responsibility").
196 See Abraham & Weiler, supra note 156, at 404-06 (suggesting that enter-
prise liability would work like a workman's compensation system with scheduled
compensation). We are not concerned with such limits. Similarly, alternative dispute
resolution could be part of enterprise liability. Sage, supra note 162, at 189-91. Yet,
U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence may prove important to the arbitration
of medical malpractice claims. In Doctor's Assocs., [sic] v. Casarotto, the
Court held that the Federal Arbitration Act preempts state laws requiring
arbitration agreements to contain elements such as bold-face type, manda-
tory disclosure, or rescissionary periods that are not applicable to other
contracts.
Id. at 191 (citation omitted).
197 See Schloendorff v. Soc'y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92 (N.Y. 1914) ("[Tihe
physician occupies the position... of an independent contractor, following a separate
calling"), overruled by Bing v. Thunig, 143 N.E.2d 3, 8 (N.Y. 1957).
198 PATRICIA F. JACOBSON, Prohibition Against Corporate Practice of Medi-
cine: Dinosaur or Dynamic Doctrine?, in 1993 HEALTH LAW HANDBOOK 67-69 (Al-
ice G. Gosfield ed., 1993).
199 See Benedict v. Bondi, 122 A.2d 209 (Pa. 1956) (noting that under the
"Captain of the Ship" doctrine, even nursing activities were not hospital action but
rather an action done at the discretion of a physician), overruled by Thompson v.
Nason Hosp., 527 Pa. 330 (1991).
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of charitable immunity.200 However, the calculus concerning
liability changed after World War II with the commercial intro-
duction of medical insurance,20 1 which forever changed the
view of business organizations in health care delivery. 
202
1. Hospital Liability
The watershed case that applied corporate liability to hospi-
tals and abolished charitable immunity, thereby making hospi-
tals liable for the quality of medical care delivered within its
walls, was Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hospi-
tal.203 Mr. Darling developed complications after having been
hospitalized for the treatment of a broken leg. Because his com-
plications were not detected in a timely manner, Darling even-
tually had to have a major amputation. The hospital was found
to be directly and vicariously liable because its nursing staff had
failed to detect Darling's deteriorating condition.204 In reaching
its holding, the Darling court applied corporate liability theory
to the hospital. Under this theory, it was the "hospital's own
negligence-not the negligence of its non-employee medical
staff' that triggered the hospital's liability.20 5 Corporate liability
200 See, e.g., McDonald v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 120 Mass. 432 (1876) (finding
that public charitable hospital was not liable for injury to patient caused by their neg-
ligence).
201 The concept of medical insurance was first introduced to the public on a
limited basis during the Depression.
202 See generally Abraham & Weiler, supra note 156, at 385 (introducing the
legal and economic evolution of the hospital to enterprise liability).
203 211 N.E.2d 253 (111. 1965).
204 Id. at 256.
205 Craig W. Dallon, Understanding Judicial Review of Hospitals' Physician
Credentialing and Peer Review Decisions, 73 TEMP. L. REV. 597, 621 (2000). Dar-
ling's application of direct corporate liability was a natural extension of the principle
that hospitals were vicariously liable for the action of their employees under the doc-
trine of respondeat superior. See Bing v. Thunig, 143 N.E.2d 3, 8 (N.Y. 1957) (find-
ing hospital liable for nurse's negligent application of an antiseptic that resulted in a
chemical bum). It is ... a non sequitur to conclude that because a hospital cannot
practice medicine or psychiatry, it cannot be liable for the actions of its employed
agents and servants who may be so licensed." Sloan v. Metro. Health Council of
Indianapolis, Inc., 516 N.E.2d 1104, 1108 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987). Hospitals have also
been found to be vicariously liable for non-employees under the doctrine of ostensi-
ble agency. "Although emergency room treatment is the most prominent setting for
apparent- authority claims against hospitals, comparable vicarious liability suits have
been successfully launched against hospitals for the alleged negligence of anesthesi-
ologists, radiologists, pathologists, and even occasionally against a surgeon whose
services the patient used because he was on the hospital staff." Abraham & Weiler,
supra note 156, at 388. "The tacit premise of courts that impose agency liability on
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"imposes an independent duty on the hospital to use reasonable
care to scrutinize and verify the (continuing) qualifications of
its physicians. 2 °6
Since Darling, numerous courts have imposed liability on
hospitals for injuries resulting from the negligence of the hospi-
tal's medical and nursing staff.207 However, limits exist as to
how far a hospital's corporate liability extended. "Only the
Alaska Supreme Court has explicitly held that the hospital's
legal responsibility for malpractice by its physicians is
non-delegable and non-waivable-the same duty that now gov-
erns airline liability, for example, even if an airline uses pilots
or mechanics on an independent-contractor basis."
20 8
A key feature of the Darling opinion was that third party
professional standards-the Joint Commission for Accreditation
of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO) guidelines for accredita-
tion of hospitals-were admissible into evidence to establish the
standard of care. Medical guidelines provide a bright line to de-
note what is appropriate medical care under the same or similar
conditions. "Since the early 1970s, the JCAHO has required
hospitals to establish programs to improve the quality and ap-
propriateness of patient care., 20 9 Such corporate activities in-
hospitals based on apparent authority is that patients, so informed, would shop around
for hospitals that did employ their physicians." Id. at 389.206 Abraham & Weiler, supra note 156, at 391.
207 Dallon, supra note 205, at 620; See Insinga v. LaBella, 543 So. 2d 209,
213-14 (Fla. 1989) (citing Darling and adopting corporate negligence doctrine); Corleto
v. Shore Mem'l Hosp., 350 A.2d 534, 539 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1975) (finding
vicarious liability where hospital contracted with incompetent physician); Diaz v. Feil,
881 P.2d 745, 749 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994) (clarifying corporate negligence doctrine
adopted in New Mexico); Bost v. Riley, 262 S.E.2d 391, 396 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980)
(citing Darling for hospital's duty to patient); Strubhart v. Perry Mem'l Hosp. Trust
Auth., 903 P.2d 263, 275-76 & n. 13 (Okla. 1995) (reviewing jurisdictions adopting
corporate negligence doctrine); Thompson v. Nason Hosp., 591 A.2d 703, 707 (Pa.
1991) (finding hospital liable under corporate negligence doctrine); Rodrigues v.
Miriam Hosp., 623 A.2d 456, 462-63 (R.I. 1993) (applying doctrine of corporate negli-
gence where hospital failed to exercise reasonable care selecting staff); Denton Reg'l
Med. Ctr. v. LaCroix, 947 S.W.2d 941, 950 (Tex. App. 1997) (declaring, under Texas
law, hospital may be independently liable for injury); Pedroza v. Bryant, 677 P.2d 166,
169-70 (Wash. 1984) (detailing history of corporate negligence theory and adopting
corporate negligence); But see Gafner v. Down East Cmty. Hosp., 735 A.2d 969 (Me.
1999) (refusing to adopt corporate liability theory, as formulated in Darling and
Thompson, in cases concerning negligence of hospital staff).
208 Abraham & Weiler, supra note 156, at 389.
209 Id. at 396.
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elude a duty to select and monitor its agents and perform quality
210assurance audits.
Virtually all [quality assurance] programs employ
personnel other than the patient's treating physicians to
evaluate, recommend, or require protocols for the care
provided by those physicians .... [Quality assurance]
programs often focus on the overall quality of care pro-
vided by a particular hospital, thereby giving the hospi-
tal an even more direct stake in the quality of care pro-
vided by individual physicians on its premises.211
The importance of external guidelines like JCAHO standards
for corporate liability is that, like a business organization's by-
laws, violations of these standards will serve as evidence of
breach of the standard of care and thereby may trigger corporate
liability.
2. Managed Care Organization Liability
The jurisprudence that governs liability for managed care
organizations (MCOs) 212 evolved in a fashion analogous to hos-
pitals. Initially, MCOs, like the hospitals before them, were in-
sulated from liability for medical malpractice because a physi-
cian's conduct was perceived as being independent of MCO
control.213 Similarly, no liability inured to the IPA model HMO
because physicians providing medical care were "independent
contractors. 214 But, as MCOs began to behave more like hospi-
2 10 See Elam v. Coll. Park Hosp., 183 Cal. Rptr. 156 (Ct. App. 1982) (holding
that a hospital has a duty to carefully select and review its medical staff so as to pre-
vent unreasonable risk of harm to its patients); Johnson v. Misericordia Cmty. Hosp.,
301 N.W.2d 156 (Wisc. 1981) (concluding that a hospital owes a duty of care to its
patients in investigating and verifying the credentials of its applicants when it is fore-
seeable that a failure to do so would result in harm to patients).
211 Abraham & Weiler, supra note 156, at 397.
212 A discussion of the business organization of MCO is beyond the scope of
this article. For general information on this topic, see Edward P. Richards & Thomas
R. McLean, Physicians in Managed Care, a Multidimensional Analysis of New
Trends in Liability and Business Risk, 18 J. LEGAL MED. 443 (1997).
213 See Mitts ex rel Mitts v. H.I.P. of Greater N.Y., 478 N.Y.S.2d 910 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1984) (holding that a Health Insurance Plan cannot be liable in malpractice
for the actions of a physician because the organization did not treat anyone).
214 Raglin v. HMO Ill. Inc., 595 N.E.2d 153, 156 (11l. App. Ct. 1992), over-
ruled by Petrovich v. Share Health Plan, 719 N.E.2d 756 (111. 1999). Whether physi-
cians were ever truly independent contractors under managed care medicine is debat-
able. See Pulvers v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, 160 Cal. Rptr. 392 (Ct. App. 1979)
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tals in selecting physicians and engaging in quality assurance,2 15
the calculus for MCO liability began to change. Like Darling,
the liability of the MCO was forever changed by the application
of corporate liability under Jones v. Chicago HMO Ltd. of Illi-
nois,216 which held that MCO's could be liable for "institutional
negligence."
In 1992, three-month old Shawndale Jones developed signs
and symptom of an acute febrile illness. Her mother called Dr. Jor-
dan, who had been assigned by the HMO to provide primary care
for Jones, but he was too busy to take the call. An assistant advised
the mother to administer caster oil. The following day the child was
worse, so the mother brought Shawndale to an emergency room
where the child was diagnosed with "bacterial meningitis, secon-
dary to bilateral otitis media, an ear infection." 217 Ultimately, the
child was permanently disabled by this condition.
Dr. Jones was under a capitation contract to provide care
for public aid patients that contained the clause, 'shall provide
all Beneficiaries with medical care consistent with prevailing
community standards.'2 18 During discovery, it was learned that
the HMO was aware that Dr. Jordan was the "only physician
who was willing to serve the public aid membership in Chicago
Heights., 219 Accordingly, Dr. Jordan was under contract to pro-
vide primary care for over 4500 patients as of Dec. 1, 1990.220
The medical director for the HMO provided testimony that he
believed that HCFA guidelines recommended that only 3500
patients be assigned to a pediatrician. 221 In her suit against the
(finding no cause of action against an HMO, which alleged that Kaiser had fraudu-
lently lead the plaintiff into believing that she was receiving the best quality of care).
215 The federal government regulates HMO quality through 42 U.S.C. §
300(e)(c)(6) (1994) (providing that every HMO shall establish an ongoing quality
assurance program for its health services stressing health outcomes and providing
review by physicians and other health professionals).
216 730 N.E.2d 1119, 1128 (111. 2000) (explaining that "[i]nstitutional negli-
gence is also known as direct corporate negligence").217 Id. at 1123.
218 Id. at 1126.
219 Id. at 1125.
220 id.
221 id.
Federal rules set the appropriate level of financial incentives at no more
than twenty-five percent for physicians with a patient panel size of 25,000
or fewer patients. Federal law sets no limits on managed care panels larger
than 25,000, on the assumption that physician groups with such larger pan-
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IMO, the mother alleged that the HMO was liable for "(1) neg-
ligently assigning Dr. Jordan as Shawndale's primary care phy-
sician while he was serving an overloaded patient population,
and (2) negligently adopting procedures that required Jones to
call first for an appointment before visiting the doctor's office
or obtaining emergency care. 222 The trial court granted the de-
fendant HMO's summary judgment.
The Supreme Court of Illinois began its analysis by observ-
ing that since Darling, the court had "acknowledged an inde-
pendent duty of hospitals to assume responsibility for the care
of their patients., 223 "[A] hospital must act as would a 'reasona-
bly careful hospital' under the circumstances." 224 The court then
took notice that in a manner analogous to the changes in hospi-
tals that occurred in the 1950s, MCOs had taken on a greater
role of providing medical care in the 1990s.225 Specifically,
MCOs "regularly employ on a salary basis a large staff of phy-
sicians, nurses and internes, [sic] as well as administrative and
manual workers, and they charge patients for medical care and,,226 ,
treatment, collecting for such services. Modem MCOs, "like
hospitals, consist of an amalgam of many individuals who play
various roles in order toprovide comprehensive health care ser-
vices to their members.'
For an MCO to provide comprehensive health services, the
MCO has to hire (or arrange for) health care providers and provide
for oversight for the selection and credentialing of its profes-
sional staffs, 228 and utilization review.229 Accordingly, as in Jones
state courts began to recognize that MCO's, as employers who pro-
els can adequately spread risk and are therefore not at substantial financial
risk.
Furrow, supra note 184, at 465-66.
222 Jones, 730 N.E.2d at 1123-24.
223 Id. at 1128.
224 Id. (quoting Advincula v. United Blood Servs., 678 N.E.2d 1009 (1996)).
m See id.
226 Id.
227 Id.
m See Sage, supra note 162 (indicating that "selection and credentialing
requirements for health plans now approach the level of detail traditionally reserved
for hospital medical staffs").
229 Utilization review is a fundamental insurance process which is an "indirect
means to control treatment decisions." Jack K. Kilcullen, Groping for the Reins:
ERISA, HMO Malpractice, and Enterprise Liability, 22 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 25
(1996). In principle, utilization review "reduces medical costs while providing in-
creased health care alternatives." Glenn, supra note 193, at 332.
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vided oversight of health care delivery, should appropriately be sub-
jected to liability for their negligent actions. 30 Thus, MCOs could
be held directly liable for their negligent failure to adequately
select a plan provider 3' and to provide utilization review.
Moreover, MCOs have been found vicariously liable for the
conduct of their employees under the doctrine of respondeat su-
perior.
233
Thus, the Jones court, having determined that the doctrine
of corporate negligence was applicable to MCOs, re-examined
the law and facts that governed the instant case.234 "The forego-
ing principles of law establish that the crucial difference be-
tween ordinary negligence and professional malpractice actions
is the necessity of expert testimony to establish the standard of
care and that its breach was the cause of the plaintiffs in-
230 Sage, supra note 162, at 174.
231 McClellan v. Health Maint. Org. of Pa, 604 A.2d 1053, 1059 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1992).
232 See Wickline v. State, 239 Cal. Rptr. 810, 819 (noting that [t]hird party
payors of health care services can be held legally accountable when medically inap-
propriate decisions result from defects in the design or implementation of cost con-
tainment mechanisms").
233 See Schleier v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan of the Mid-Atlantic States, Inc.,
876 F.2d 174, 177-78 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (finding that an HMO could be held vicari-
ously liable for the actions of an independent consulting physician based on the the-
ory of respondeat superior); Sloan v. Metro. Health Council of Indianapolis, Inc., 516
N.E.2d 1104, 1107-09 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987) (finding that health maintenance organi-
zation could not avoid medical malpractice liability under the doctrine of respondeat
superior by not incorporating under the Professional Corporations Act); Contra
Harrell v. Total Health Care, Inc., 781 S.W.2d 58 (Mo. 1989) (holding that an non-
profit HMO could not be vicariously liable for patient injuries because it was a
"health services corporation" protected from such liability by statute); Cf Mitts v.
H.I.P. of Greater N.Y., 478 N.Y.S.2d 910, 911 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984) (holding that a
defendant that sells insurance rather than practice medicine could not be held vicari-
ously liable for the medical malpractice of independent contractors). Although MCO
liability was initially limited to the staff model MCO, because courts "relied on a
statutory provision permitting corporations to render professional services to hold
that an HMO's staff physicians are not independent contractors," liability was
quickly expanded to less integrated form of MCOs. Kilcullen, supra note 229, at 29.
Ultimately the courts have even held that an MCO could be held vicariously liable for
the medical malpractice of its independent-contractor physicians under both the doc-
trines of apparent authority and implied authority. See Petrovich v. Share Health Plan
of Ill., Inc., 719 N.E.2d 756, 775 (Ill. 1999); see also Lancaster v. Kaiser Found.
Health Plan of Mid-Atlantic States, Inc., 958 F. Supp. 1137, 1150 (E.D. Va. 1997)
(finding that ERISA did not preempt state law medical malpractice claims against
health maintenance organizations based on physicians' alleged negligence in
diagnosing and treating an ERISA plan participant's brain tumor).
2m4 Jones v. Chicago HMO Ltd. of Ill., 730 N.E.2d 1119, 1129 (ll. 2000).
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jury."235 Again, citing Darling, the court opined that corporate
negligence could be treated as ordinary negligence, especially
in cases where there were independent guidelines.236 Thus, ex-
pert testimony was not always required to establish the standard
of care in an institutional negligence action. The "standard of
care required of a hospital in a case of institutional negligence
may be shown by a wide variety of evidence, including, but not
limited to, expert testimony, hospital bylaws, statutes, accredita-
tion standards, custom and community practice., 237 The Chi-
cago HMO's own medical director had testified that Dr. Jordan
had been assigned patients in excess of the federal guidelines,
which was sufficient to establish breach of the standard of
care.238 As for causation, the court stated it could
easily infer from this record that Dr. Jordan's failure to
see Shawndale resulted from an inability to serve an
overloaded patient population. A lay juror can discern
that a physician who has thousands more patients than
he should will not have time to service them all in an
appropriate manner.239
Thus, the court held that even without expert testimony, there
was a genuine dispute between the parties. Accordingly, the
trial court erred when it granted summary judgment for the de-
fendant.24°
3. Limitation of Corporate Liability
The above discussion indicates that existing law imposes
direct liability upon institutional providers of health care ser-
vices regardless of whether the health care is provided within
the walls of a hospital or coordinated under the aegis of the
MCO medical director in a distant city. Thus, a threshold ques-
tion to proposing the adoption of enterprise liability, in any
form, is why is this needed if institutional providers are already
subjected to direct corporate liability? The answer is that corpo-
215 Id. at 1130.
2361d. at 1130-31.
23 7 Id. at 1131.
238 Id. at 1132.
239 Id. at 1133.
240 However, the court upheld the trial court granting of summary judgment
on the basis of negligent appointment procedures because the plaintiff had not pro-
vided expert testimony that would be required to set the standard of care. Id. at 1135.
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rate and agency liability theories, as they apply to institutional
health care, contain many loopholes that allow wrongdoers to
escape. 241 For example, unless the hospital or MCO directly
employs the physician extender, if a patient is harmed by the
independent act of a physician extender acting within the scope
of his practice, the harm may go uncompensated.242 Conse-
quently, the existing corporate and agency liability under the
common law "leaves a large penumbra of uncertainty for anx-
ious providers in terms of its case-by-case application of gen-
eral principles; it encourages liability avoidance or risk-shifting
strategies rather than risk management. ' 243 Thus, while the end
results of enterprise liability may be generally possible under
other doctrines, including corporate liability,244 advocates of
enterprise liability seek a unified doctrine to guide future health
care policy. Unfortunately, rather than being a unified doctrine,
the current legal literature suggests that enterprise liability is
polymorphic and more akin to a field of theories than a discrete
doctrine.
B. Enterprise Liability: Beauty Is in the Eye of the Beholder
Paul Weiler and Kenneth S. Abraham originated the con-
cept of enterprise liability, as it applies to health care, in the
early 1990s. 245 Weiler and Abraham realized at the end of the
1980s that the United States' health care delivery system had
become complex; the autonomous solo physician practitioners
241 See Abraham & Weiler, supra note 156, at 391-92 (listing various exam-
ples where corporate liability may be difficult to ascertain due to practical and proce-
dural reasons, such as discovery difficulties).242 See supra, Part IV.
24 3 Furrow, supra note 184, at 502.
244 See Glenn, supra note 193, at 327-38.
245 Id. at 309. Enterprise liability, however, has it roots ultimately in product
liability. See Kilcullen, supra note 229, at 10. Francis Bohlen, "proposed the benefit
theory, which treats liability as an internal cost borne by the party benefited by the
behavior which put the victim at risk." Id. Building on this concept Fleming James
observed that the limitation of traditional fault-based tort liability was that it treated
parties as economic equals, thereby permitting moral judgment of one party's con-
duct to deter injurious actions; which was no longer true in industrialized America.
Id. at 11. James' distributed justice system, whereby a "person nominally liable is
often only a conduit through whom this process of distribution starts to flow" forms
the bases of enterprise liability. Id.
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were no longer providing the decisionmaking in our system.246
Health care has become increasingly complex because of the
costs of medical services, ERISA's protection of MCOs, and the
present shift of health care to the ambulatory setting. At the be-
ginning of the 1980s, hospitals were the pivotal business struc-
ture in our health care delivery system. However, by the mid-
1980s, double-digit medical inflation, precipitated by the costs
of the Vietnam War and the Arab Oil embargo,247 resulted in the
federal government's announcement that it would move away
from the traditional fee-for-service medical reimbursement
scheme.248 Thus, by the end of the 1980s, prospective payment
by both the federal government and the insurance companies
resulted in payors of medical services gaining hegemony in the
medical hierarchy. 249 The complexity initially arose because
prospective payment schemes fundamentally altered the doctor-
patient relationship.250
MCOs directly contributed to the complexity of health care
delivery. Furrow argued that even without the increasing use of
physician extenders, that enterprise liability is a more appropri-
ate system than the traditional medical malpractice system for
redressing adverse medical events. Traditional "tort doctrines
focus on the physician while shielding the MCO, federal law
246 See Furrow, supra note 184, at 473 (noting that "[b]y 1996, more than a
third of physicians were located in group practices of three or more and another third
were employees or contractors").
2 7 See generally Mark A. Hall, Institutional Control of Physician Behavior:
Legal Barriers to Health Care Cost Containment, 137 U. PA. L. Rv. 431,435 & n. 6
(1988) (explaining that in the mid 1980s, aggressive new public and private initia-
tives showed the potential for reining in previously unharnessed health care infla-
tion).
248 See Eleanor D. Kinney, The Medicare Appeals System for Coverage and
Payment Disputes: Achieving Fairness in a Time of Constraint, 1 ADmiN. L. J. 1, 33-
34 (1987) (reciting recent legislative reforms in an attempt to reduce rising Medicare
costs).
249 See Morreim, supra note 195, at 975 (stating that the "market-oriented
health policy of the 1980s and 1990s could easily give way to heavy-handed govern-
ment regulation of MCOs unless private-law remedies for torts lnd breach of contract
are perceived to provide adequate deterrence of quality lapses"). "Enterprise liability
as a hospital-oriented concept gained little foothold, partly because changing eco-
nomic conditions soon meant that health plans, rather than hospitals, became the
important locus of control over the financing, delivery, and accountability of care."
Id. at 974. Others have questioned whether hospitals are the fundamental business
organization for health care delivery. See Sage, supra note 162, at 191 (stating that
"hospitals are increasingly peripheral to basic medical care").
250 See McLean & Richards, supra note 8, at 34-35 (noting that fee for service
schemes encourage the physician to do everything possible for the patient).
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reinforces these tort defenses with ERISA preemption, and ad-
vocates of managed care further limit remedies through volun-
tary binding arbitration of disputes, while pushing even further
for contractually set standards of care., 251 This is especially true
in light of the shift in health care delivery to more ambulatory
settings. As a result, the "shift toward ambulatory and
home-based care is resulting in a greater ercentage of malprac-
tice cases with no hospital involvement."
' 52
Thus, the financial winds of the 1980s left the federal gov-
ernment and MCOs firmly at the apex of the medical decision-
making tree. Hence, because the medical service payors253 are
the "single entity responsible for integrating and coordinating
the financing and delivery of services," they are better suited to
the application of enterprise liability than more traditional
health care delivery.25 4 Moreover, by the 1990s, flux in the
health care industry made it clear that health care quality is in-
exorably linked to health care costs.2 5 5 To cope with the market
changes, Weiler and Abraham recommended that enterprise li-
ability be applied to hospitals. 6 But, because it is now clear
that health care payors have become the pivotal business or-
ganizations in health care delivery, applying enterprise liability
to hospitals no longer appears to be appropriate. Thus, as used
here, enterprise liability is "a principle which shifts legal re-
sponsibility for medical liability from individual providers to
health plans with which the patients have contracted. 257 Thus,
251 Furrow, supra note 184, at 425.
252 Sage, supra note 162, at 163.
253 Herein the term "medical service payor" is used to denote any integrated
health plan that coordinates both delivery of and payment for medical services. Thus
all MCO plans are medical service payors. But, the term medical service payors is
intended to be broader in scope so as to include the federal government because ar-
guably its extensive health care regulations impact the delivery of health care. More-
over, because the federal government is the largest purchaser of health care services,
if the Institute of Medicine is successful in revolutionizing health care delivery, it is
difficult to see how this can be achieved without having the federal government on
board. Cf. Kilcullen, supra note 229, at 9, (noting that "[t]hrough ERISA the federal
government sacrificed fundamental patient protection to encourage the private sector
provision of health care and pension benefits").
2m Furrow, supra note 184, at 430.
255 See McLean, supra note 6 (noting that the quality of a country's health
care is dependent on what it can afford).
25 Abraham & Weiler, supra note 156.
257 Glenn, supra note 193, at 306. "'Enterprise medical liability' is a term
used to describe a system in which health care organizations bear responsibility for
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the medical service providers would be analogous to a product
manufacturer who places a product into the stream of com-
merce. How enterprise liability would in actuality be applied to
a medical service payor varies with the commentator."* How-
ever, there are basically two forms of enterprise liability in the
legal literature.
1. Weiler-Abraham Enterprise Liability
Under the Weiler-Abraham form of enterprise liability all
"present-day vicarious, agency, and corporate liability theories"
would be used to redress the medically adverse events.259 Under
Weiler-Abraham enterprise liability, medical service payors
"would be the exclusive bearers of medical liability for all mal-
practice claims brought by hospitalized patients-regardless of
the provider's status as employee, independent contractor, or
holder of admitting privileges, and regardless of the site of the
provider's malpractice., 260 Therefore, under Weiler-Abraham
enterprise liability, an injured patient would not have a cause of
action against the individual health care provider, whether it be
a physician or a physician extender. Weiler-Abraham enterprise
liability would, however, not be identical to no-fault insurance
coverage, because Weiler-Abraham enterprise liability "would
still base liability on documented [provider] malpractice.' ' 61
Thus, while Weiler-Abraham fault-based enterprise liability is
medical malpractice in addition to or instead of individual health professionals."
Sage, supra note 162, at 159.
258 Conceptually, enterprise liability would have to be applied to the federal
government for the Institute of Medicine's vision of health care delivery to make
sense because the federal government is the largest medical service payor. Herein, I
am only concerned with how enterprise liability is needed to provide the right finan-
cial incentives to improve, rather than degrade, health care delivery. National health
care policy is beyond the scope of this article.
259 Abraham & Weiler, supra note 156, at 393. Since the publication of this
article, the term "hospital" has been replaced with "medical service payor", as it ap-
plies in Abraham and Weiler's article, in accordance with changes in health care over
the last decade.260 id.
261 Id. at 414. In reality, Weiler was interested in using enterprise liability as a
bridge to no-fault liability. "By making medical causation rather than medical fault
the predicate to recovery, no-fault medical compensation would expand the universe
of those entitled to compensation. At the same time, this shift of emphasis from fault
to cause would simplify certain aspects of the compensation decision and thereby
reduce administrative costs." Id. at 432-33 (citation omitted); see generally Studdert
et al., supra note 190, at 25 (reporting results of no-fault compensation system versus
the current tort system).
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essentially a derivative cause of action, it is not vicarious liabil-
ity. Some have implied it is only vicarious liability but this is
incorrect. 26
2
Weiler-Abraham enterprise liability has two significant
limitations. First, Weiler-Abraham enterprise liability, which
has been advanced as a transitional step to no-fault coverage, is
illogical because it favors vicarious-like liability actions over
direct claims.263 As such, Weiler-Abraham enterprise liability is
similar to the liability that a hospital and MCO faces under the
doctrine of corporate liability. However, unlike the liability of a
hospital or MCO under the doctrine of corporate liability,
Weiler-Abraham enterprise liability would preclude direct li-
ability actions against a provider in exchange for a more stream-
lined cause of action. This potentially could mean that a patient
injured by a negligent health care provider would be under
compensated.
Traditionally, hospitals have not had an incentive to reduce
medical errors because it could be financially disadvantageous
for the hospital to police its providers. For example, if each year
a hospital receives millions of dollars in remuneration for medi-
cal services provided under the direction of one of its physi-
cians, it is not in the hospital's financial interest to discipline
such a physician even if it knows or should have known the
physician was error-prone. In this situation, behavioral econom-
ics would dictate that the hospital would not give up a present
lucrative revenue stream because of the potential for a smaller
future liability. Similarly, if Weiler-Abraham enterprise liability
were applied to a medical service payor, there would be little
incentive for the medical service provider to discipline a health
care provider (whether physician or physician extender) who
substantially reduced expenses even if the medical service
payor knew or should have known the provider was cutting cor-
ners and creating a population of patients at risk of being
harmed. 264 In short, Weiler-Abraham enterprise liability does
262 See Clark C. Havighurst, Vicarious Liability: Relocating Responsibility for
the Quality of Medical Care, 26 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 9-10, (2000) (noting that vicari-
ous liability is often advocated under the label 'enterprise liability').
263 Sage, supra note 162, at 186.
264 Arguably this is the present situation with MCOs. Because the employers
shop around each year for a bargain premium, the MCO develops a short time hori-
zon. Thus, if the MCO can put off providing a medical service for less than a year,
that expense of that service maybe passed on to a different carrier.
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not provide the right financial incentive to meet the Institute of
Medicine's number one goal for health care: make it safe.265
Rather, Weiler-Abraham enterprise liability appears to be only
an interim step to no-fault medical liability coverage as its in-
novator had intended.
2. Kilcullen Enterprise Liability
Kilcullen, too, recognized that health care delivery is in a
flux:
Just as the Nineteenth century market place has
been replaced by the almost-Twenty-first century su-
permarket, the family doctor is gradually relocating to
the physician roster of the neighborhood HMO. The
only difference is that the layers attenuating the rela-
tionship between doctor and patient may not be so ap-
parent as they are between producer and consumer.2 66
In Kilcullen's view, enterprise liability for health care de-
livery is entirely analogous to product liability. Thus, even be-
fore Crossing the Quality Chasm advocated the intercalation of
physician extenders into the doctor-patient relationship, Kilcul-
len advanced three arguments to compel a shift in medical li-
ability coverage from the traditional indemnity medical mal-
practice model to enterprise liability. First, "[t]he technical level
of design and delivery of health care services is no less daunting
than in the manufacture of automobiles"-in both situations the
general public is "equipped with only crude indicators of qual-
ity. Thus, consumers will never achieve a true position of mar-
ket parity., 267 Second, the concept of "spreading risk through
professional liability insurance for the plan's providers is al-
ready part of health care delivery., 268 Finally, if ERISA medical
jurisprudence has taught us anything, "the cost of safety should
be internalized to the plan and not ... externalized to the in-
jured patient., 269 Kilcullen observes that assigning liability to
the enterprise that produces a product "becomes an economic
265 QuALrIf CHASM, supra note 1, at 5.
26 Kilcullen, supra note 229, at 47.
267 Id. at 48.
268 Id.
269 Id.; see also Edward P. Richards & Thomas R. McLean, ERISA Preemp-
tion and Managed Care Litigation after Pegram v. Herdrich, NAT'L LAW REV., June
18, 2001, at B8.
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incentive to invest in design of safety features, quality control
of production, and truth in marketing" because failure to do so
would compromise profits.27 °
Ultimately, the concept that a manufacturer should be held
liable for injuries caused by a defective product is premised
upon the concept of enterprise liability for casting defective
products into the stream of commerce. Presently, the scope of
enterprise liability is so broad that, for dangerous fungible
products, a manufacturer may be held liable for "products that
cannot easily be traced back to the actual manufacturer.' 2 72 In
product liability cases, liability does not turn on whether the
risk was unforeseeable, but rather whether the risks associated
with the product outweigh its benefits.2 7 3 In Kilcullen's view, a
medical service is a "product of a network of trained individu-
als, many of whom have no contact with the patient. ' 274 Like
the unsophisticated consumer who purchases a product, "pa-
tients lack the bargaining power to negotiate all aspects of
treatment." 275 Thus, Kilcullen opines "consumers of health care
are no less justified in seeking relief from the burden of proving
fault than consumers of products, especially because health care
270 Kilcullen, supra note 229, at 15; see also Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods,
Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1963) (stating that the purpose of imposing liability on
manufacturing enterprise "is to insure that the costs of injuries resulting from defec-
tive products are borne by the manufacturers that put such products on the market
rather than by the injured persons who are powerless to protect themselves").
271 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2 cmt. a (Tentative
Draft No. 2, 1995) (discussing the rationale behind establishing separate standards of
liability for manufacturing defects, design defects and defects based on inadequate
warnings); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402 (1965) (stating that "[a]
seller of a chattel manufactured by a third person, who neither knows nor has reason
to know that it is, or is likely to be, dangerous, is not liable in an action for negli-
gence for harm caused by the dangerous character or condition of the chattel because
of his failure to discover the danger by an inspection or test of the chattel before sell-
ing it").272 Richard E. Kaye, Annotation, "Concert of Activity," "Alternate Liability,"
"Enterprise Liability," or Similar Theory as Basis for Imposing Liability Upon One
or More Manufacturers of Defective Uniform Product, in Absence of Identification of
Manufacturer of Precise Unit or Batch Causing Injury, 63 A.L.R.5th 195 (1998).
273 White v. Caterpillar, Inc., 867 P.2d 100, 105 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993); see
also Armentrout v. FMC Corp., 842 P.2d 175, 184 (Colo. 1992) (observing that con-
sumer expectations are a relevant factor in risk-utility analysis). This is clearly in
accordance with Institute of Medicine's goal that twenty-first century health care be
patient driven.
274 Kilcullen, supra note 229, at 15. This is in accord with current hospital
terminology where departments have been supplanted by "product lines."
275 Id.
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providers claim a nobler motivation than profiting from the pro-
vided service." 276 Under the Kilcullen model, all health care
providers "would be treated as part of a single enterprise, hospi-
tal, or health-care organization, thereby treating such medical
enterprises as product liability law now treats other commercial
enterprises such as airlines."' 7
C. Kilcullen's Enterprise Liability: Meeting the Institute of
Medicine's Goals to Improve Health Care
If in the twenty-first century health care delivery is to be
based upon a multidisciplinary team approach to control health
care costs, patients will be receiving a greater proportion of
their health care from individuals with less formal training than
the current physician providers. Assertions that as a group, phy-
sician extenders provided the same quality of health care as
physicians are unsupported by hard statistical data. Moreover,
collaborative multidisciplinary health care delivery, because it
inserts another caregiver between the physician and the patient,
of necessity increases the complexity of our health care system,
thereby increasing the potential number of handoff errors. Thus,
the unassailable corollary of implementation of collaborative
multidisciplinary medicine to cut health care costs is that it will
be less safe than our autonomous physician-based approach.278
Thus, to maintain our health care at its present quality
level, incentives need to be placed into the health care delivery
system to encourage physician extenders (and those who em-
ploy or contract with physician extenders) to provide quality
health care. Financial incentives to provide a "physician level"
quality of care in a collaborative multidisciplinary setting do not
exist by intent of system. Moreover, it is clear that the tradi-
tional liability system does not provide the proper incentives to
276Id. at 11.
277 Furrow, supra note 184, at 502. Far from legal theory, early on the Clinton
administration attempted to implement such "tort reform." See Sage, supra note 162,
at 162-63 (discussing a model for enterprise liability that would replace suits against
physicians, proposed in 1993 by President Clinton's Task Force on National Health
Care Reform). There is more than a passing resemblance between the combination of
the Institute of Medicine's vision of twenty-first century health care health care cou-
pled with the mandates of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
and the proposed practice of medicine envisioned in ill-fated the Health Security Act
of 1993.
278 The only conceivable reason to increase the proportion of health care de-
livered by physician extenders is to cut costs.
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achieve this goal and, in fact, provides counter-incentives. Spe-
cifically, if a physician extender renders care within the scope
of the extender's training and not immediately under physician
supervision (without question the precise condition the Institute
of Medicine intends), then under our traditional system the phy-
sician extender is individually and solely liable for any negli-
gent care rendered, just as a traditional physician would be un-
der similar conditions. There is no guarantee that under the facts
of a particular case, a legitimately injured patient would prevail
in either a direct corporate liability or vicarious liability action
against the physician extender's employer. If the physician ex-
tender has chosen not to be insured or was inadequately insured,
then a patient negligently injured by the physician extender
would be under-compensated. 279
Under Kilcullen enterprise liability the medical service
payor, i.e., the party who ultimately approves all the business
decisions that create and perpetuate the financial incentives un-
der which physician and physician extenders would render
medical services, would be liable for all negligent medical care
rendered. Thus Kilcullen enterprise liability would provide
more appropriate financial incentives to align the interests of
patients and health care providers than would those presently
provided under traditional medical malpractice theories. In this
regard, health care payors would have appropriate incentives to
see to it that physician extenders are properly credentialed, in-
sured, and supervised. 280 "[T]he most valuable insights about
medical accidents generated by the [Institute of Medicine's To
Err is Human] came from the institution's piecing together a
series of apparently idiosyncratic incidents to find common pat-
terns in the way that errors by people or equipment occurred."
281
Medical errors are system errors.2a2 This means that if we want
279 See supra, Part IV.
280 See Morreim, supra note 195, at 977 ("If MCOs become solely responsible
for adverse medical outcomes, it is reasonable to expect that they will require their
physicians to adhere closely to MCO-chosen guidelines.").
281 Abraham & Weiler, supra note 156, at 412.
282 See To ERR Is HUMAN, supra note 2, at 3. In the Institute of Medicine's
view, to effectively detect and correct medical errors, a non-punitive culture must be
provided to encourage error reporting. Thus enterprise liability has the potential of
increasing physician cooperation. See Morreim, supra note 195, at 974 (noting that
physicians relieved of concerns of individual liability are more likely to engage in
cooperative decisionmaking). Enterprise liability will facilitate physician compliance
with clinical guidelines. See Sage, supra note 162, at 188 ("Specifically, from a li-
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to reduce medical errors associated with the inevitable increase
in handoff mistakes among physician extenders, the system
must bear the responsibility for any errors.283 Accordingly, to
maintain the current quality of care level, all medical service
payors need to be given proper incentives to oversee the care
provided by physician extenders, as well as physicians. This
could better be achieved under enterprise liability rather than
more traditional tort theory.
Enterprise liability, by assigning all liability for medical er-
rors to the medical service payor, provides the medical service
payor with a strong financial incentive to detect and correct er-
rors in the health care system.284 Under enterprise liability, be-
cause medical service payors would be responsible for errors in
communication, they would more readily invest in support sys-
tems to enhance the amount, quality, and flow of information.285
It is axiomatic that the reason the medical service payor would
invest in support systems is not only to avoid ultimate liability
for a medical error, but also, to reduce the next provider insur-
ance premium. Such insurance premiums would, like any other
insurance, reflect the medical service payor's past experience. A
medical service payor that efficiently detects and corrects errors
made by physicians and physician extenders would be rewarded
with a lower insurance premium. The medical service payor
who provide quality medical care would thereby be able to
compete more efficiently for patient in the marketplace.
This kind of experience rating has been a long-time fea-
ture of business liability and workers' compensation in-
surance. Because the prices paid by consumers for
products and the wages paid to labor tend to be stan-
ability perspective, rule-based cost containment may be preferable to delegated au-
thority using incentive compensation.").
2.8 See generally Lori B. Andrews et al., An Alternative Strategy for Studying
Adverse Events in Medical Care, 349 THE LANCET 309 (1997) (finding that, of 1047
hospital patient studies, nearly 18% experienced adverse events that led to longer
hospital stays and increased costs and that these adverse events need to be discussed
for the system to function).
4 In addition, "the public may be better protected from incompetent practi-
tioners by the credentialing, disclosure, and quality management activities of man-
aged care organizations than by direct government regulation of individual physi-
cians. In an analogy to enterprise liability, this reasoning has stimulated interest in
institutional licensure as a replacement for individual licensure." Sage, supra note
162, at 196 n.182.
285 Id, at 167.
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dardized in their respective markets, safer firms make a
profit and dangerous firms incur a loss from experience
rating. The prospect of such profits and losses tends to
give firms the incentive to reduce the risks of injury to
optimal levels.286
Enterprise liability should not necessarily increase overall
health care costs. 287 To control costs, medical service payors
have increasingly been moving to employ physicians directly or
control them to such a degree that an agency relationship would
be created. Thus, medical service payors already bear direct and
vicarious liability for their physicians' activities.288 "Further-
more, medical groups typically purchase liability insurance as a
unit, and many are large enough to substitute self-insurance or
off-shore captive subsidiary arrangements for commercial cov-
erage. 289 Thus, the added administrative and insurance cost for
providing coverage for the physician extender (the physician's
agent) should not be onerous. Moreover, because insurance
premiums are "invariably experience-rated" 290 and a medical
service payor would be larger than any existing physician group
(both in number of providers employed and geographic distribu-
tion), this greater risk pool means that the medical service payor
would pay less per provider than current physician groups for
liability coverage. Moreover, many medical service payors
"also have the financial wherewithal to self-insure up to high
levels of risk, removing any dilutional effect of insurance on
deterrence.." 291 In short, given the greater risk, spreading the po-
tential of the medical service payor compared with any physi-
cian's group, the medical service payor would be in the best po-
sition to shoulder or, in the alternative, provide the financial
incentives for the insurance costs associated with the increased
utilization of physician extenders.
286 Abraham & Weiler, supra note 156, at 409.
287 Mandating that physician extenders all carry liability insurance would not
only create a cost for employers of physician extenders that for the most part does not
exist at present, but insurance premiums would certainly increase over the current
nominal charge because of perceived increased liability exposure. See Interview with
Karolyn M. Scanlon, supra note 160.
288 See Sage, supra note 162, at 202 (noting that most "medical groups al-
ready bear respondeat superior liability for their physicians' activities").289 Id.290Id. at 198.
291 id.
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VI. CONCLUSION
In Crossing the Quality Chasm the Institute of Medicine
advocated moving away from the autonomous physician pro-
vider model of health care delivery model to the physician ex-
tender driven collaborative multidisciplinary model of health
care delivery. While the scope of practice for physicians and
physician extenders is clearly governed by state law, the federal
government, using its power of the purse, is clearly in a position
to facilitate a shift in our health care delivery system to the phy-
sician extender model. Moreover medical services payors, in-
cluding the federal government, would clearly benefit from such
a shift because physician extenders are willing to provide many
medical services at a price substantially less than their physician
counterparts. However, shifting to a health care delivery system
dominated by physician extenders will likely be more error
prone (or at least as error prone) than a physician-driven health
care system. Thus, under a collaborative multidisciplinary
model of health care delivery, the quality of health care deliv-
ered is likely to be compromised. To counteract this shift in
quality, adoption of enterprise liability for health care delivery
will be necessary since allowing physician extenders to practice
under the current medical malpractice system will either result
in overall increase in insurance costs or negligently injured pa-
tients receiving sub-optimal compensation. While the Institute
of Medicine has many excellent ideas about health care deliv-
ery, if the country is to "buy-into" any part of the Institute's
health care revolution, one must buy-into the complete package.
In short, to ensure that the standard of medical care is not low-
ered by a national decision to facilitate collaborative multidisci-
plinary health care delivery, the country must be prepared to
move to enterprise liability for health care delivery. When it
comes to the vision of health care announced in Crossing the
Quality Chasm, Gilbert's remarks are apt: "in for a penny, in for
a pound. 292
292 WILLIAM S. GILBERT, IOLANTHE act 2.
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